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CONSTABULARY CAPABILITIES FOR LOW-LEVEL CONFLICT


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April 1969

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Summary and Recommendations

This review of American military involvement in five overseas constabulary operations was undertaken for the purpose of inferring general principles and lessons that can guide U.S. operations in countries threatened by insurgency. The five cases that were examined, and their approximate dates, are listed below:

Philippine Constabulary	1901-1946
<u>Fita Fita</u> Guard (American Samoa)	1900-1951
<u>Garde d'Haiti</u>	1916-1934
<u>Guardia Nacional</u> <u>Nicaragua</u>	1927-1933
Combined Action Program (South Vietnam) . .	1965-

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The Nature of Constabulary Forces

The constabulary is a special purpose force whose unique characteristics and requirements stem directly from the nature of its mission. It is an instrument of civil control with the basic mission of creating and maintaining order within a nation or subdivision thereof. In carrying out that mission, constabulary forces may engage in a wide variety of activities--ranging from police work and quasi-military patrolling to intelligence collection, psychological operations, and civil affairs. The ultimate objective of these activities is to create order in an unstable situation while

assisting in and encouraging the development of social organization and public attitudes that are conducive to long-term stability.

The differences between constabularies and general purpose military forces reflect their different missions. A nation's general purpose forces are designed to combat (similar) foreign armies. Such forces may require the support of constabulary operations--to protect rear areas, lines of communication, etc.--but such operations are not their primary mission. The performance of constabulary functions by general purpose forces necessarily involves either a considerable revamping of the regular forces, with damaging effects on their conventional warfare capabilities, or the under-utilization of their manpower and weaponry on missions requiring capabilities in addition to those required of main force units.

The Need for Constabulary Forces

The need for capabilities like those of an effective constabulary is based on the probable requirements of American foreign policy, the nature of the strategic environment, and the characteristics of low-level warfare and insurgency in the underdeveloped countries. Briefly, the major considerations are:

- . The limitations placed on the use and flexibility of conventional military forces by the existence of the nuclear stalemate and attendant risks of escalation toward total war.
- . The sophisticated use, by insurgents, of ideology and revolutionary techniques to undermine existing political authority structures--particularly their capability to multiply their military strength and threat by using civilian populations to perform such functions as recruiting, intelligence collection, communications, and logistical support.

- . The necessity of countering and defeating insurgent movements at the grass-roots level, where insurgents seek to establish a political base among the population.
- . The difficulties of using general purpose forces against insurgents--difficulties originating in (a) the inappropriate training, organization, and methods of regular forces for dealing with low-level warfare, (b) the danger of dislocating the economy and society by introducing large units in an area having a low living standard and limited resources, and (c) the danger of alienating the population in the course of large operations by regular forces.
- . The exacerbation of the above-noted conditions when U.S. general purpose forces operate in an underdeveloped country--particularly problems arising from cross-cultural contact which become ready targets for insurgent propaganda.
- . The need for a credible U.S. capability to deal with low-level conflict with a minimal commitment of American manpower and resources--a need arising from the political impact of overseas involvement on the American public, as well as from the expectations of governments to which the U.S. has commitments.

In light of these factors, U.S. contingency planning should give detailed attention to advisory and constabulary-like capabilities that can be employed against insurgents, either as supports for U.S. and allied main forces or (wherever possible) as the sole military back-up for U.S. policy in threatened countries.

Objectives of the Study

Five constabulary operations, occurring in diverse contexts over a period of some 70 years, are described in Part Two. The case descriptions, and analyses in Parts Three and Four, represent an effort to

infer general principles and guides from these historical experiences.

In particular, the research addressed the following questions:

- . From available evidence on the five cases, what approaches, doctrines, and techniques have consistently produced favorable, or counter-productive effects?
- . What factors appear to account for successes and failures in the five operations?
- . From this body of experience, what guides and recommendations for the organization and employment of constabulary forces can be inferred?

Clearly, this study represents a partial and introductory analysis. Its principal objective was to draw on historical experience in diverse contexts to formulate a first approximation of the requirements for an effective constabulary operation under conditions likely to prevail in the future. Further analysis of ongoing operations is the logical next step in the examination of the constabulary's potential as an instrument of U.S. policy.

Findings

Two sets of conclusions and recommendations have been inferred from the historical cases and the CAP experience in Vietnam: the first set includes measures required to develop an institutional preparedness to undertake operations of a constabulary nature, should U.S. policy call for such operations. The second set includes operational guides for forces engaged in constabulary or similar operations.

Institutional Preparedness

Training in traditional military modes of operation is not adequate preparation for missions intrinsic to low level warfare. In none of the five cases studied have U.S. military forces been adequately prepared. There is substantial evidence in the cases reviewed that adequate preparations for such situations can lead to accomplishment of the U.S. mission at a reasonable cost, while lack of preparedness can lead to long and costly commitments, less than complete success, and adverse world reactions. Adequate preparedness requires for guidance the institutionalizing of a set of experiences different from those intrinsic to conventional warfare.

Based on previous and current experiences treated in this report, four areas stand out as requiring special attention to establish an ongoing capability to conduct operations of a constabulary nature successfully.

1. Doctrine Development. Further study of previous constabulary experiences, including those of other countries; the use of social science perspectives and methods to identify promising techniques, concepts, etc.; the systematic evaluation of techniques in field situations wherever possible; and the integration of results obtained above into doctrine covering tactics and operations at all levels.
2. Training. Specialized training in doctrine, area culture, and language to provide a reservoir of trained personnel who can implement effective low-level conflict operations immediately upon entry, with minimal reliance on trial-and-error assimilation of cultural and other factors affecting cross-cultural communications.
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4. Area Packet. Further development of updated information on overseas areas in condensed form, with guides for using such information.

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Areas of special concern to planners, commanders, and others involved in field operations of a constabulary nature are also discussed in the final section of the report. These areas, which differ in terms of level and specificity, are listed below:

- a. Translating U.S. objectives into operational guidance.
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- h. Grievance systems.
- i. Language capability and civilian intelligence.
- j. Providing for supervision and feedback.

⑥
CONSTABULARY CAPABILITIES FOR
LOW-LEVEL CONFLICT.

① Final report

⑪ Apr 1969

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Acknowledgments are due to a number of people who helped make this study possible. The idea for this study was developed through discussions with Dr. John A. Nagay, Director of Group Psychology Programs at the Office of Naval Research, and Colonel Donald P. Wyckoff, then Head of the Civil Affairs Branch (G-3 Division), Headquarters, USMC. Dr. Nagay's support for the study is much appreciated.

This study has benefitted from the cooperation of Lieutenant Colonel Donald L. Evans, Jr., now Head of the Civil Affairs Branch, and members of his staff. Colonel Evans, Captain Marshall B. Darling, Psychological Operations Officer, Civil Affairs Branch, and Lieutenant Calvin D. Brown of that office have provided materials, reviewed drafts, and made useful suggestions; their assistance has made this an enjoyable as well as rewarding effort.

Lieutenant Brown, who as an NCO commanded an outstanding Combined Action Platoon in the Phu Bai area, has provided many insights concerning what can be accomplished by a leader who understands the requirements of a constabulary mission. Our conclusions in the CAP case and Part IV have been influenced by his thinking.

Special thanks are due Mrs. Audrey Reniere and Mrs. Gail Shull, who patiently typed and revised the many drafts that can be generated by four authors in search of common rules of punctuation.

A Special Acknowledgment

Any study of constabulary and similar operations should acknowledge the contribution of the authors of the Marine Corps Small Wars Manual of 1940. In an area otherwise notable for the absence of an "institutionalized memory" or consistent efforts to profit from past experience, the Manual stated concisely many concepts and guides that are as applicable today. The following excerpts are pertinent:

On the Nature of Small Wars: Small wars demand the highest type of leadership directed by intelligence, resourcefulness, and ingenuity. Small wars are conceived in uncertainty, are conducted often with precarious responsibility and doubtful authority, under indeterminate orders lacking specific instructions.

On the Mission: In a major war the mission assigned to the armed forces is usually unequivocal--the defeat and destruction of the hostile forces. This is seldom true in small wars. More often than not, the mission will be to establish and maintain law and order Frequently the commander is not given a specific mission as such . . . it then become necessary for him to deduce his mission from the general intent of higher authority the mission should be accomplished with a minimum loss of life and property and by methods that leave no aftermath of bitterness or render the return to peace unnecessarily difficult.

On the Central Importance of the Psychological Factor: In small wars . . . instead of striving to generate the maximum power with forces available, the goal is to gain decisive results with the least application of force and the consequent minimum loss of life. This requires recourse to the principles of psychology, and is the reason why the study of psychology of the people is so important in preparation for small wars

Psychological errors may be committed which antagonize the population of the country occupied and all the foreign sympathizers; mistakes may have the most far-reaching effect and it may require a long period to reestablish confidence, respect, and order.

On the Need for Language Skills: Political methods and motives which govern the actions of foreign people and their political parties, incomprehensible at best to the average North American, are practically beyond the understanding of persons who do not speak their language. If not already familiar with the language, all officers upon assignment to expeditionary duty should study and acquire a working knowledge of it.

To which might be added this early recognition of special problems of subsystems integration and logistical support:

Mixed pack trains of bulls and horses do not operate smoothly due to their different characteristics.

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PART ONE
INTRODUCTION

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PART TWO
CASE DESCRIPTIONS OF
FIVE CONSTABULARY OPERATIONS

Introduction

Historically, constabularies have been used in situations where unrest and disorder could not be handled by local authorities and police, but where opposition was not such that combat-trained military forces represented a necessary or appropriate response. Although the specific functions of constabularies have varied with the country and situation, the concept of the constabulary has essentially been that of a peace-keeping force charged with certain police functions and certain military functions (patrolling, security, etc.).

It is in the nature of a constabulary that it operates in close contact with the civilian population. Such contact carries with it the potential for using civilian sources of information and the constabulary's familiarity with grass-roots conditions to support its operations, whether these be directed against bandits, political opponents, or insurgents armed with sophisticated revolutionary methods and doctrines. The constabulary's essential mission and mode of operation thus coincides with the requirement for a grass-roots response to Communist "wars of national liberation." This apparent applicability of the constabulary concept is the basic reason for undertaking the present study.

Other developments in the area of low-level or "limited" conflict also suggest the need for constabulary-like capabilities. Civil affairs and development-oriented military activities are increasingly recognized as important to overseas operations. Such activities--communications by acts--can be explained and strengthened by supporting verbal

communications designed to shape opinion; i. e., psychological operations. (The potency of these approaches is ever evident in their sophisticated use by Communist insurgents.) A better understanding of, and appreciation for, the role of civil affairs and psychological operations is gradually developing among U. S. military forces. Research in both areas is developing knowledge which can serve as a base for more powerful weapons against insurgents. A constabulary's presence among civil populations gives it an excellent opportunity to apply methods and techniques from psychological operations and civil affairs most effectively.

Despite their seeming relevance to the demands of modern conflict, and despite the frequency with which U. S. forces have been involved in operations of a constabulary nature, these constabulary experiences have not, by and large, been reflected in American military doctrine.* The professional military officer could safely assume that constabulary operations were merely side-shows to the main event. Conventional military doctrine, organization, and training were considered adequate for constabularies--where they were insufficient, shortcomings were not likely to be of earth-shaking significance, at least to the military careerist. And much could be said for this point of view; even in retrospect, who would have advocated sending the more capable and better-trained Marines to the Haitian constabulary when their comrades were reducing the Chateau-Thierry salient?

With the coming of the Cold War and the nuclear era, however, operations of a constabulary nature have shifted much closer to center-stage. U. S. involvement in, or indirect support of, such operations in Greece, Thailand, French Indo-China, Laos, the Philippines, and

*With at least one notable exception: U. S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual. Restricted. (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1940).

other limited conflict situations were not main events; but when nuclear deterrence ruled out total war, they became important parts of the main arena. Even where, as in Vietnam, large U. S. general purpose forces are ashore, there has emerged a need for the constabulary type of operation on the part of both U. S. forces and their indigenous allies.

In sum, the constabulary's traditional role and operating mode, its potential for incorporating and using civil affairs and psychological operations, and its suitability for small-war involvements suggest that the concept be studied more carefully. This study is a first-cut effort to identify general principles and guides that seem to be valid in a variety of cases, including the current Combined Action Program in Vietnam. The five cases are described in the pages that follow.

The Philippine Constabulary

The Spanish-American War, which led to the cession of the Philippine Archipelago to the United States, coincided in time with a native Filipino rebellion against Spanish authority. Emilio Aguinaldo, the leader of the insurrection in its last stage, proclaimed the independence of the Philippines in June of 1898, some six months before the Treaty of Paris (December 1898) formally transferred the more than 7,000 islands to American control. In January 1899, Aguinaldo announced a new constitution for the Philippine Republic, and on 4 February 1899 the Filipinos commenced an insurrection against the American occupiers that was to last three years, to result in 10,000 American casualties, and to cost approximately \$600 million.¹

Development of U. S. Administration

The Schurman Commission, composed of American civilian and military personnel, was established in January 1899 to study the social and political state of the Philippines and the legislative needs of the inhabitants. The Commission was also to report on:

...the measures which should be instituted for the maintenance of order, peace, and the public welfare, either as temporary steps to be taken immediately... or as suggestions for future legislation.²

¹Background material for this section has been drawn from Howard M. Merriman, "The Philippines (1899-1902)," in D. M. Condit and Bert H. Cooper, et al. (eds.), Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict, Volume I: The Experience in Asia (Washington: Center for Research in Social Systems, 1968), pp. 91-111; and Leandro H. Fernandez, A Brief History of the Philippines (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1932).

²Ibid., p. 101.

On 4 April 1899, the Schurmann Commission affirmed U. S. sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and announced the American intention to institute reforms and establish an honest government with Filipino participation. Military activities against insurgents were to constitute only one part of the overall U. S. effort.

A second Commission, under the leadership of William Howard Taft, was established early in 1900 and authorized to assume all legislative powers previously held by the U. S. military in the Philippines. This commission started with an enlightened charter which set U. S. objectives in perspective and laid the groundwork for the melding, under American guidance, of critical elements of the American and the Spanish-Philippine culture. The American approach was stated in President McKinley's instructions to the Philippine Commission (probably drafted by Taft), which read in part:

In all the forms of government and administrative provisions which they are authorized to prescribe, the Commission should bear in mind that the government which they are establishing is designed not for our satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands, and the measures adopted should be made to conform to their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just and effective government. At the same time the Commission should bear in mind, and the people of the Islands should be made plainly to understand, that there are certain great principles of government which have been made the basis of our governmental system, which we deem essential to the rule of law and the maintenance of individual freedom, and of which they have, unfortunately, been denied the experience possessed by us; that there are also certain practical rules of government which have been found to be essential to the preservation of these great principles of liberty and law, and that these principles and these rules of government must be established and maintained in their islands for the sake of their liberty and happiness, however much they

may conflict with the customs or laws of procedure with which they are familiar. It is evident that the most enlightened thought of the Philippine Islands fully appreciates the importance of these principles and rules, and they will inevitably within a short time command universal assent.³

This was the charter that Taft would implement. It reflected the Americans' determination to avoid the practices they associated with "imperialism," as well as their belief that certain universal principles or laws were basically applicable to Philippine political behavior and organization.

But more important for our purposes, this charter provided a policy basis and high-level sanction for developing a workable approach to political administration and effective military operations against an insurgency. In these necessarily general terms, it struck a balance between the objectives of the American mission--the encouragement of certain styles of political life, the development of a "sound" governmental structure, and the growth of a literate citizenry--and the requirement that all U. S. measures should be as consistent as possible with local custom. Whatever the mission in other situations, and however advisable or effective it was in this case, it is critical that the mission was stated in high-level policy in a manner that clearly suggested the spirit and means of conducting it. Furthermore, the charter reflected--and probably conveyed to its Filipino readers--the American intent to take account of the opinions of elite or persuasive groups of Filipinos in carrying out the U. S. policy in the Islands.

³Herman Hall, Manual for the Philippine Constabulary, 1915. From the only extant copy of the original, through the cooperation of the owner, Lt. Colonel H. H. Elarth, USA-Ret. Reproduced February 1963 for ORA-USOM-AID-VN.

It is also significant for present purposes that the American administrators, led by Taft, faithfully executed the letter and spirit of the charter discussed above. Such a statement of policy is, of course, no guarantee that implementation will follow, and the choice of an administrator who contributed substantially to the initial statement of American policy insured, in this case, that it was faithfully carried out. Taft's Commission proved an active one; during its first year it passed 449 acts covering administrative, political, social, and economic matters. Among these were acts establishing a road-building program that encouraged the support of Philippine leaders and people. Within a few years, the rebellion was curbed.⁴

The Constabulary

The creation of an insular constabulary followed upon the Act Providing for the Organization and Government of an Insular Constabulary and for Inspection of the Municipal Police, passed by the Taft Commission on 18 July 1901.⁵ Because the U. S. military had neither the "will" nor the capacity to perform police duties and maintain public order throughout the scattered Filipino communities during and after the insurgency, American authorities very early saw the need for such a force. Accordingly, the Philippine Constabulary was established on 8 August 1901.

⁴Merriman, op. cit., p. 104.

⁵Emanuel A. Baja, Philippine Police System and its Problems (Manila: Pobre's Press, 1933), p. 64.

Rationale

A general plan drawn up for the constabulary called for the establishment of:

... an insular force of not exceeding one hundred and fifty men for each province selected from the natives thereof who may be mounted in whole or in part and who are placed under the immediate command of one or more, not exceeding four, provincial governors.⁶

The organization of the constabulary was to follow two principles:

1. Americans should, as a general rule, be in command of constabulary forces to be organized in the provinces and noncommissioned officers and privates should be Filipinos.
2. Each province should furnish its quota of men, whose operations ordinarily were to be confined to their province.⁷

This second principle was extremely significant in that it involved:

... a departure from the rule which had invariably controlled the English in their colonial possessions and the Spaniards in their dealings with the Filipinos, their policy having been to utilize native troops as a constabulary in other districts than that from which they were drawn, thereby taking advantage of supposed tribal prejudices and, as it was believed, removing the tendency to disloyalty or inefficiency which would exist when dealing with their own immediate friends and neighbors. The Commission, however, thought that as against these possible disadvantages there were substantial benefits to be derived from pursuing the opposite course. It was believed that with proper treatment there need be no fear of treachery, that there was a

⁶W. Cameron Forbes, The Philippine Islands (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945), p. 105.

⁷Baja, op. cit., pp. 64-65.

great advantage in having the police operating in a particular province familiar with its terrain and the people living therein, and finally, that in view of the fact that these people were kinsmen and neighbors of the constabulary there would be absent that disposition to abuse and oppression which has always been found to exist when native military or constabulary forces were operating among strangers and often hereditary enemies.⁸

Organization

The constabulary was composed of approximately 5,000 Filipino soldiers commanded by American officers.⁹ Enlisted personnel were drawn from all Filipino classes and ethnic and religious groups. During the period 1901-1917, the constabulary was primarily an American-controlled body.¹⁰ Efforts to "Filipinize" the control of the constabulary did not begin until 1912.

Officers were drawn from the regular U. S. Army and later included qualified Filipinos. The performance of the American officers first appointed was quite unsatisfactory, and it became necessary to replace them with men possessing better qualifications and training.¹¹ Consequently, in 1903, under Act 643 of the Commission, it became the practice to select constabulary officers from U. S. schools and colleges that offered military training under the direction of U. S. Army

⁸ From Report of Secretary of Commerce and Police, 1903, quoted in Baja, op. cit., pp. 64-65.

⁹ Harold H. Elarth (ed.), The Story of the Philippine Constabulary (Los Angeles: Globe Printing Co., 1949), p. 13.

¹⁰ Baja, op. cit., p. 66.

¹¹ Charles B. Elliott, The Philippines (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1917).

officers.¹² These schools and colleges thus became the primary source of constabulary officers.

The basic constabulary unit was the company, composed of from 45 to 60 enlisted men; there were no battalions or regiments. One company or more was assigned to each of the provinces in the islands. Frequently these companies were broken down into smaller bodies, which were assigned to the more remote parts of the Islands and commanded by noncommissioned officers.¹³ For purposes of administration, the Archipelago was divided into five districts, each under the charge of an Assistant Chief of the Constabulary.

Missions

The constabulary was created primarily for the purpose of "preserving the peace, keeping order, enforcing the laws,"¹⁴ and helping to maintain a stable government in the Islands. The Constabulary was the only one of the several bodies established to enforce law and order that was organized, trained, and equipped to use military force. It performed a broad range of military and civil police duties as a paramilitary national police institution, constructed around traditional U. S. military concepts.

Reinforcing and complimenting the constabulary was each town's municipal police force, established by the Philippine Commission. The municipal police were first placed under the authority of the military; later, they were controlled by municipal presidents. When provincial

¹²Elarth, op. cit., p. 14.

¹³Elliott, op. cit., p. 175.

¹⁴Baja, op. cit., p. 93.

governments were established, the Commission made the municipal police subject "to the provincial governor for service anywhere in the province that the public interest might require."¹⁵ Unfortunately, local politics apparently intruded in the operations of the police; at least it was reported that the municipal presidents, under whose control the police operated,

...regarded municipal police very largely as their personal servants and used them as messengers and for menial duties. . . . Under these circumstances it was not to be expected that they would be an efficient force in the maintenance of public order.¹⁶

Although the constabulary and the municipal police were to be "partners," with the constabulary acting in the senior role, the Constabulary in fact exercised supervisory powers over the police in the municipalities.¹⁷ Because the constabulary was composed of better trained military-policemen, it was considerably better equipped to deal with the complexities of enforcing law and order than the highly political, rather poorly disciplined, and ill-trained municipal police.

During the first five or six years of its operation, the Constabulary was used primarily as a military force in Luzon and the Visayas.¹⁸ It was also given extensive police powers, which were exercised through the small Constabulary patrol networks interlacing the entire territory. Unfortunately, at the beginning of its operations:

Military authorities were slow to recognize the real value of the constabulary. At first there was a

¹⁵Forbes, op. cit., p. 104.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 105.

¹⁷Baja, op. cit., p. 182.

¹⁸Elarth, op. cit., p. 133.

disposition to regard the officers as policemen--a sublimated sort, possibly, but policemen nevertheless--and entitled to official and social recognition as such only. ¹⁹

As the scope of the civil government expanded, and recognition of the broad capabilities of the Constabulary grew, it was given many additional duties which went far beyond the original plan for its use. Gradually, the Constabulary assumed the following duties:

- tax collection;
- guarding and expediting the mails; postmaster duties;
- maintenance of quarantines;
- transfer of prisoners;
- supply of commissaries;
- maintenance of telegraph and telephone lines;
- control and regulation of the manufacture, sale, or other disposal of firearms and explosives. ²⁰

From practically the beginning of its operations, the constabulary participated in a comprehensive development program initiated by the Philippine Commission. Constabulary elements assisted in developing the educational system, establishing health clinics, and constructing public works projects, in addition to their regularly assigned duties. Upon occasion, in regions occupied by tribal peoples, Constabulary officers were appointed governors of districts. In the province of Morox, Constabulary officers were appointed secretaries of districts under Army officers serving as governors, and elsewhere they were made ex officio justices of the peace. ²¹

As the Constabulary's reputation came to be that of an efficient, reliable organization interested in the welfare of the community, and as

¹⁹ Elliott, op. cit., p. 177.

²⁰ Baja, op. cit., pp. 102-103.

²¹ Ibid.

Filipino Constabulary officers became prominent members of local communities, patterns of cooperation with the civil population were expanded and reinforced. Largely because of this cooperative relationship, the Constabulary's intelligence system became quite effective. In fact:

No secret organization was started in the Islands but one or more agents of the Constabulary enrolled among its members, and all its movements, views, and the persons concerned in the movement... were known to the authorities.²²

By 1914 even the most radical element among the Filipino people apparently had been convinced of the futility of force as the means of gaining political independence, for thereafter history records no insurgent movement of any importance for 32 years.²³

The Constabulary achieved the surrender of great numbers of outlaws. No outlaw band of any size could move without at once becoming the point of convergence for several detachments of troops, and the morale of bandit groups was broken by constant defeats and losses. As banditry ceased to be an attractive profession, men deserted in droves, and the outlaw "generals" soon found themselves with few followers.²⁴ The Constabulary force and concept achieved success and status.

Training

During the formative period of the Constabulary, and particularly during the insurgency which did not end until 1902, abuses by constabulary elements and their harsh treatment of prisoners indicated a

²²Forbes, op. cit. p. 111.

²³Elarth, op. cit., p. 40.

²⁴Ibid, p. 47.

need for close supervision of Constabulary units to prevent such excesses. For example, in the Manual of the Constabulary can be found the following regulation, which can be assumed to be a response to the need for better discipline:

Any member of the Constabulary who whips, maltreats, abuses, subjects to physical violence, or tortures by the so-called "water cure," or otherwise, any native of the Philippine Islands shall be punished by imprisonment at hard labor for 5 years or by a fine of not more than \$5,000 or both.²⁵

This need was further underlined by the tendency of some Constabulary elements to misuse their powers to attain personal ends. Although such abuses were usually committed by enlisted men, it became apparent that training in traditional military skills was not alone sufficient to enable the Constabulary to develop cordial relationships with the Filipino population. Speaking of Constabulary officers, one observer commented:

Combat efficiency now no longer was the prime requisite of an officer, for in its new duties it was tact and diplomacy, patience, and sympathetic understanding, and a knowledge of law and civil government which were essential to success.²⁶

As the Constabulary grew in experience, discipline, and maturity, and as the quality of its personnel improved, its relationships with the Filipino population were measurably improved. A better selection process for U. S. officers (see ppg. 6-7) and intensive training provided at the three-month Constabulary school at Baguio contributed to the professionalization of the officer corps. In addition, the Constabulary's

²⁵Hall, op. cit., p. 386.

²⁶Elarth, op. cit., p. 133.

conciliatory policy of "benevolent attraction" toward the public was instrumental in reversing earlier suspicions and distrust. The involvement of the force in the comprehensive developmental program mounted by the government also helped to generate a more favorable image.

Of great importance was the policy of encouraging U. S. officers to develop native language skills: each U. S. Constabulary officer who proved his ability to speak and read one of the native Filipino dialects was to receive additional pay of 100 pesos per year as an incentive to learn local languages. This policy improved the effectiveness of the Constabulary's civil affairs activities as well as its psychological operations. Both were critical aspects of its operations, since at one time or another the Constabulary assisted practically every branch of the government in efforts to stabilize and develop the Islands.

The success of the Constabulary was neither complete nor easily achieved. Difficulties were encountered in gaining the cooperation, compliance, and trust of the Filipino population.

There was a generally negative Filipino view of the role of a police force, stemming from prior experiences with Spanish police. In a territory where local police forces had been merely extensions of a dictatorial Spanish regime, public distrust of their role was bound to affect the attitudes and actions of the civil populace toward other police forces. The abuses, political machinations, and poor discipline characteristics of the municipal police did nothing to reverse this unpopularity of local police forces.

Abuses by Constabulary elements could reinforce these attitudes and retard the development of mutually satisfactory relations between the Constabulary and the civilian population.²⁷ In many remote areas of the

²⁷ Baja, op. cit., p. 185-186.

Islands American constabulary officers were frequently the sole governmental representatives of the United States; their conduct was extremely critical because of its affect on the formation of Filipino attitudes toward both the Constabulary and the U. S. in general. Poor conduct on the part of these officers, however atypical in fact, was often perceived as typical of American behavior.²⁸

Given the scope of U. S. involvement in the Philippines, the nature of that involvement, and the Filipino desire for independence, it was inevitable that a number of Filipino officials would resent the extension of the Constabulary's authority and regard its activities as encroachments on their spheres. In addition, Filipino officials sometimes viewed the Constabulary's assumption of powers as "a subtle reflection on their ability."²⁹ Consequently, in some cases the relationships between Constabulary officers and Filipino civil officials became quite strained.

Governor Taft indicated that one important cause of poor relations between the Constabulary and Filipino officials was

The lack of tact on the part of some of the American inspectors engaged in the provinces. The authority which they exercise over the constabulary of the province, which generally is the only effective police body, is apt to make them feel independent of the government of the province, especially if they are young and inexperienced; and when they think that they do not find in the native governor, the active, energetic assistance to which they are entitled, they conduct themselves in a manner not calculated to conciliate the governor or to secure any useful cooperation with him.³⁰

²⁸Elarth, op. cit., p. 14.

²⁹Ibid., p. 133.

³⁰Quoted in Elliott, op. cit., p. 174, footnote 20.

In an effort to reduce the conflict, a specific provision of the Organic Act signed on 2 July 1902 required the

senior Constabulary officer in the province...to cooperate to the fullest extent with the provincial governor, keeping him constantly informed on peace conditions; indeed, the law required that the governor be advised of Constabulary action beforehand, if possible.³¹

In fact, however, this regulation was not always observed.

The fact that governors in many provinces were elected officials, and thus deeply involved in politics, meant that Constabulary officers had to deal with a variety of political factors and considerations. Successful cooperation with such elected officials "called for qualities not often demanded of military men."³² These difficulties and others were gradually overcome as the quality of Constabulary officers improved, however, and by 1908 the frictions between the Constabulary and Filipino civil officials had been substantially reduced.³³

Civil Affairs

Constabulary detachments were scattered throughout the territory and maintained a network of small, well-coordinated patrols radiating from some 130 stations and bases.³⁴ As a result, the Constabulary was in daily contact with large segments of the Filipino population and intimately involved in the daily life of Filipino communities. Recognition of the importance of the civil interface, and of the importance of the

³¹Elarth, op. cit., p. 133.

³²Ibid.

³³Ibid.

³⁴Baja, op. cit., p. 102.

psychological element in this interface, is shown in the Philippine Constabulary Manual:

Constabulary officers who are most successful in keeping in close touch with the people and in convincing them that the Constabulary is their friend desiring to protect and aid the community, often render great service in helping to allay local disagreements or to smooth away differences that might give rise to disturbances. By taking a kindly interest in the affairs of the people and assisting in local celebrations and other village concerns, officers not only find a means of becoming well acquainted with the people but also make friends who often render them great assistance in their work.³⁵

The fact that Filipino enlisted men--and after 1912, Filipino officers--were assigned to the areas from which they were recruited, and thus spoke the local dialect, enabled them to gather information on popular aspirations and grievances. In short, they were in a unique position to "feel the popular pulse."³⁶

The capability to take advantage of this rapport with the local population was enhanced by the timely development of an effective doctrine of civic action, which placed Americans in activities perceived as responsive to civilian needs. Examples of such activities were the use of American soldiers as teachers, the provision of health clinics under military supervision, and the use of troops, to some extent, in the construction of public works--all of them activities which would tend to undermine native suspicions of foreign "occupiers" and their allied Constabulary force.³⁷

³⁵Hall, op. cit., p. 22.

³⁶Forbes, op. cit., p. 111.

³⁷Andrew D. Sens, A Summary of the U. S. Role in Insurgency Situations in the Philippine Islands 1899-1955 (Washington: Special Operations Research Office, 1964).

Summary

Granting the difficulty of establishing definitive cause-effect relationships from historical data, we suggest that several factors contributed importantly to the relatively effective constabulary experience in the Philippines:³⁸

1. We started out on the right foot. McKinley's proclamation--widely distributed to all islanders--laid the groundwork for an effective working relationship between U. S. officials and Filipinos.
2. Constabulary units organized initially were not very effective; in some instances they were counterproductive. However, close surveillance was exercised over relationships between the Constabulary and the people. When it was found that Constabulary personnel were not performing effectively in their role, emphasis was placed on improving the quality of the Constabulary through improved selection methods and training and through penalties, supported by law, for Constabulary members who mistreated the people.
3. The farsighted U. S. programs for the development of the islands combined an appreciation of the problems with an understanding of the Filipino desire for independence. From the beginning the U. S. administration of the Islands was constructed around a combination of measures by the U. S. military as an agent -- measures designed to improve the socio-economic, educational, and health conditions. By 1900 the U. S. was conducting military and political programs simultaneously.

³⁸The Philippine Constabulary became the Constabulary Division of the Philippine Army in January 1936. It was reconstructed as the Philippine Constabulary in 1938 but was disbanded at the outbreak of WWII. In July, 1945, the Constabulary was reformed as the Military Police Command of the Philippine Army and reorganized as the Philippine Constabulary in January 1948. See Elarth, op. cit., p. 13. During WWII the Constabulary had become an extension of the Japanese occupation. During

(Continued, next page)

4. Integration of Filipino officers into the Constabulary was begun in 1912. The ratio of Filipino to American officers increased as Filipinos were given more authority in government.

As a result of these factors, the population of the island became, on the whole, receptive to the efforts of the Constabulary to maintain order and to assist in developmental measures and the implementation of legislative programs and civic action efforts, and were willing to seek independence through peaceful means after a period of U. S. tutelage. This in turn facilitated the constabulary's performance of its missions and enabled it to become an effective and respected link between the Filipino people and the U. S. administration. Finally, the Philippine Constabulary succeeded because it became "part of the society it served. Its members were part of that society and understood it."³⁹

(Footnote 38, continued) the HUK insurgency, the Constabulary was quite ineffective largely because there had been insufficient time to rebuild the Constabulary after WWII and its personnel were quite inferior to those in earlier days. As a result, the Constabulary abused the civil population and contributed to the growth of popular grievances which the HUK insurgents exploited. In 1957 the Constabulary, which had been integrated into the Philippine Army at the height of the HUK insurrection, was reconstituted as a separate body and has served since that time as a national police force of the Philippine Republic.

³⁹ Lt. Col. Richard W. Smith, "Philippine Constabulary," Military Review, XLVIII (May, 1968), p. 80.

The Fita Fita Guard of American Samoa

Development of U. S. Naval Administration

On April 17, 1900, the two Samoan islands of Tutuila and Annuu were voluntarily ceded to the United States under the provisions of a treaty between the U. S. and the islands' leading chiefs. In addition, this treaty established a U. S. Naval Administration over island affairs and gave the U. S. "the necessary authority to obtain land for, and to exercise control over, all necessary facilities for a naval base and coaling station for American Naval vessels."⁴⁰ In return, the U. S. agreed to establish an effective and equitable government, thereby preserving the rights and customs of the Samoan people and helping them in their struggle to escape the fate of other vanishing branches of the Polynesian races in the Pacific Islands. Samoa had previously been under a three-nation protectorate of England, the United States, and Germany. After the British left in 1899, Western Samoa was under German rule, and Eastern Samoa was controlled by the U. S.

The general goals set forth in the treaty, the Instrument of Cession of the Chiefs of Tutuila to the U. S. Government, were the promotion of the peace and welfare of the people, the establishment of a good and sound government, and the preservation of the rights and property of the inhabitants.⁴¹ These goals were reflected in the following policies of the Naval Administration:

1. Nonalienation of Samoan lands.

⁴⁰ Captain Thomas F. Darden, U. S. Navy Administration of the Government of American Samoa 1900-1951 (Washington: Dept. of the Navy, 1951), p. ix.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. xiii.

2. Preservation of Samoan customs
3. Nonexploitation of the people and their resources.
4. Promotion of public health and education
5. Samoa for the Samoans.⁴²

To implement these policies, the Naval Administration translated them into the following working-level objectives:

1. Early establishment of self-governing communities.
2. Institution and maintenance of an adequate program for public health and sanitation.
3. Establishment of a general system of elementary education adapted to local environments and designed to assist in the early achievement of the objectives; facilitation of vocational and higher education, including training at professional levels.
4. Protection of the local inhabitants against the loss of their lands and resources.
5. Institution of a sound program of economic development of trade, industry and agriculture along lines which would ensure that the profits and benefits thereof accrued to the inhabitants.⁴³

The Navy took the first step to accomplish these objectives by establishing a government that was based primarily on the traditional authority of chiefs.⁴⁴ The first Naval Governor of Tutuila, Captain

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴Francis J. West, Political Advancement in the South Pacific (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 132-133.

Benjamin F. Tilley, indicated his belief in this approach when he stated that:

The Government which I propose for these islands is a Government of the chiefs who are to receive additional appointments to their positions from the Commandant of the station.⁴⁵

To implement such a policy, it was necessary for cognizant naval authorities to develop an understanding of Samoan customs and authority structures.

The Samoan village, composed of 30 to 40 households, represented the basic sociopolitical unit. There was no real central governmental machinery, no written law (although the Samoans possessed a high degree of literacy) and no predominant political figure exercising leadership over the whole area defined as American Samoa. It was discovered that the Matais, the chiefs of groups of related families living together, were the native traditional leaders. There were many grades and ranks of Matais within individual families, family groups, communities, and villages, exercising power individually or through group councils. Precedence, etiquette and ceremonial observance dominated their life.⁴⁶ Thus, the Commandant would have to start from the beginning in developing a sense of Samoan unity among village chiefs. Tilley retained continuity in the transition from the fragmented village government to the new centralized government by setting up three administrative districts--each administered by a Samoan District Governor and each corresponding to existing Samoan political districts. Assisting in the government of these districts would be a number of district and county councils.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 133.

⁴⁶Darden, op. cit., p. xii.

Village councils would have the authority to establish regulations covering matters relating to the general welfare and the protection of Samoans, and they were given enforcement and penal powers that were exercised through village magistrates. The village council or fono chose and assisted the village chief. This chief then received, from the Governor, his appointment as mayor of the district. Naval personnel solicited the advice and assistance of native officials and representatives of the Samoan villages, particularly through the fono. Samoan chiefs were vested with authority over the purely local matters. Except on occasions of disagreement at lower levels, the central government rarely interfered in village, county or district affairs.⁴⁷

Formation of the Fita Fita Guard

Rationale

Captain Tilley developed the concept of a native force which would help secure the U. S. Naval Station at Pago Pago (thus relieving the Navy of providing its own force), end feuds among Samoan groups, and provide everyday law and order. He expected that this force would provide general assistance to the American administration of Samoa, have various guard and ceremonial duties, and assist in the implementation of public health measures. In the event of war, the Guard would also serve with regular U. S. forces as lookouts, messengers, and interpreters. Therefore, Tilley requested permission from the Navy Department to organize an indigenous force of some 50 men to serve as a kind of national guard for the islands.

⁴⁷West, op. cit., p. 133.

Organization

Tilley had disarmed the population by offering each Samoan an attractive sum, which exceeded the worth of the arms subsequently turned in, and he had next promulgated an order regulating the importation of firearms. While awaiting the Navy Department's reply to his request for a native force, he recruited the nucleus of the force, primarily the sons of native chiefs. This group of Samoans, the original 36 Guard members, was drilled by noncommissioned officers in the Marine Corps and Navy and served initially without pay.⁴⁸ On July 6, 1900, Tilley received the authorization to enlist 58 Samoans as "Landsmen" in the Navy. They soon came to be known as the "Fita Fita Guard and Band." The new force was named "Fita Fita," a Samoan expression meaning "courageous," as an incentive for enlistments.⁴⁹ Guard members were paid \$16.00 per month and received in addition a food ration of \$9.00.⁵⁰

Missions

The duties of the Fita Fita Guard are known to have been numerous and varied, although there is a serious lack of information on the Guard's activities, particularly during its formative period and early operations. Its principal duty was to provide security for the U. S. Naval installations. In addition to this, the Guard served as:

- assistants to regular American forces on lookout and gun stations;
- freight handlers for incoming vessels;

⁴⁸Darden, op. cit., p. 1.

⁴⁹Herbert N. Stafford, "Making Soldiers of the Natives in Samoa," Harpers Weekly, LIX (September 9, 1905), p. 1304.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 1305.

- members of the crew of the station ship and the Governor's gig;
- information officers for official parties visiting outlying localities;
- special duty officers on the power plant, telephone system and steam launch;
- guides, messengers, interpreters, prisoner guards, radio operators, yeomen, hospitalmen, commissary men, fire fighters, chauffeurs, truck drivers, stewards, orderlies, and enginemen.⁵¹

One area of Guard activity was public health. Since Samoans had long observed the custom of "bush medicine," there was no hospital until 1912, but members of the Guard served as interpreters for doctors treating or examining Samoan patients and assisted in the care of the sick. The Fita Fita Guard assisted in alleviating unsanitary conditions which, although not completely removed even now, have been considerably improved. As Capt. Darden says:

After all, in 1915, on the subject of rats, insects, and garbage, the Public Health Officer stated that unless something was done the islands would be overrun and health conditions would become appalling. Substantially the same statement can be made in 1951. Yet the birth rate is constant at about 40 per 1,000 and the death rate is decreasing. Visitors returning after absences of a number of years report that flies and mosquitos are substantially less than formerly. It takes time to reach the point of optimum sanitation.⁵²

The Naval Government of Samoa also made continuous efforts to encourage agricultural development, though very little such help was given in U. S. funds. Early attempts at crop raising were not very successful, but experimental work was pursued under the direction of the Governor,

⁵¹Darden, op. cit., pp. 2-3.

⁵²Ibid., p. 15.

and in 1913 the first Department of Agriculture was established and a plot of ground behind the Fita Fita barracks was set aside for a local experimental station. In 1932 the agricultural program was linked with the educational program. Progress was made with new crops (such as Chinese bananas, edible cannas, papaya, cocoa, and tobacco--all hurricane resistant crops). Surveys were made of the soil and forests, and some long-range development plans were formulated.

Problems

An effective Administration in close touch with the native population managed to anticipate and alleviate any significant political problems. The Samoans readily accepted and respected the protocol arrangements established between the Navy and the Samoan elite "where each hierarchy honored the other."⁵³ This was a respect the New Zealanders were unable to attain during their government of the Western half of Samoa.

There was a delicate problem in the selection of officers for the Guard from the highest ranking Samoan chiefs. Frequently these men were not the most capable. Wherever possible the Naval Administration tried to make appointments in accordance with the relative rank of the chiefs, but with the spread of education, young people of no chiefly rank became eligible and were trained for important appointive government positions. This was, at least initially, contrary to Samoan tradition, but it was also a part of the education of the Samoan people in the conduct

⁵³Mottram Torre, The Selection of Personnel for International Service (New York: World Federation for Mental Health, 1963).

of their political life.⁵⁴ This education was an important and basic step toward the establishment of a self-sufficient governing body.

Most Americans would not subscribe to the Samoan custom of nonaccumulation of wealth. The Samoan shows little desire to accumulate goods; his prestige depends instead upon the extent to which he distributes his wealth. Under the communal system it was practically impossible for a Samoan to save money, since goods and possessions were shared communally. Members of the Fita Fita Guard and Band earned sums of money that were large in the local economy, yet almost to a man they were out of funds within a short time after each pay day. This was one custom that never really changed in all the years that the U. S. exercised its influence in Samoa.

Prestige

The Fita Fita Guard became a highly disciplined force and a prestigious symbol among the Samoan people. Because of its positive image, the Guard was able to attract the highest calibre of personnel; appointments to the Guard became highly competitive. As one observer commented at the time:

Membership in the Fita Fita Guard has come to be a highest ambition among Samoan youth, and there are numerous applications for every vacancy.⁵⁵

The Fita Fita uniform carried distinction; the Guard became a kind of communications channel between the Naval Administration and the

⁵⁴Darden, op. cit., p. 5.

⁵⁵Felix M. Keesing, A Memorandum on the Mandated Territory of Western Samoa and American Samoa (Honolulu: The Institute of Pacific Relations, 1931), p. 41.

Samoa population, and was thus instrumental in developing strong ties between Naval personnel and the population as a whole. Eventually members of the Guard became the leaders of Samoa.

The policies of the U. S. Naval Administration had taken advantage of, or complemented, key factors in Samoan culture and society. The Samoans recognize achieved rank as having the greatest importance. High chiefly titles, though obtained through lineage, were seen to be merited on the basis of an individual's own actions. The Samoans also respect, and look for in their own government, symbols of authority and protocol. The Germans, who had governed Western Samoa prior to World War I, had also been successful by matching their rigid codes of civilian and naval etiquette to the Samoan codes, thus earning the deep respect of the natives. However, Samoans did not look with favor on all representatives of foreign governments. After World War I, when Western Samoa was under a League of Nations mandate governed by New Zealand, the same principle was illustrated by negative reactions to the New Zealanders. After the Germans came in "carefully starched collars,"⁵⁶ the informal New Zealanders were not able to develop a good working relationship with the Samoans. Margaret Mead describes the New Zealand administrators:

They came from an assertively one-class society in which...class distinctions...were avoided, whether between elder and younger brothers, the better born and more humble born, the rich and the poor, the educated and the less educated, or those who perform more or less honorific types of work. Among a people with a different culture this egalitarianism might have...

⁵⁶Margaret Mead, "The Factor of Culture," in Mottram Torre, The Selection of Personnel for International Service (Geneva, Switzerland: The World Federation for Mental Health, 1963), p. 5-6.

produced better cross-cultural relationships. The Samoans, however, classified the New Zealanders' behavior as lacking in style.... The New Zealanders had little respect for the Samoans' insistence on the importance of rank. As a result, cross-cultural relationships deteriorated badly... and this deterioration is still expressed in the determined separatism of the Western Samoans.⁵⁷

Summary and Conclusions

Several factors affected in a positive manner the development of close mutual relationships between the Samoans and the Navy, and between Naval personnel and members of the Fita Fita Guard:

1. The Naval policy instituted at the beginning of the administration showed moderation, tolerance, and respect for Samoan customs, values and traditional authority systems.⁵⁸ Naval administrators showed good judgment in recognizing the need to work through traditional Samoan social and political institutions rather than attempting to superimpose a system from outside. The resulting Naval Administration was essentially a system of native administration based on Samoan social and political forms and practices.
2. Naval personnel showed respect for Samoan rank and ceremony; they were careful not to undermine the authority of native chiefs, or to treat them in a patronizing manner.
3. The Guard was made a bridge between the civilian population and the Naval Administration by building up the prestige of the Guard in the eyes of the populace. Pride was generated in members of the Guard

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Margaret Mead, "Americanization in Samoa," The American Mercury, XVI (March, 1929), p. 266.

itself and in the civilian population. Measures such as the adoption of a distinctive uniform copied largely from traditional Samoan dress, the choice of a symbolic name for the Guard, the respect shown by Naval personnel for Samoan members of the Guard, the relatively high rate of pay in the Guard--all helped the Guard to attract the best calibre of recruits.

4. The Guard was a medium through which able governmental personnel were recruited, trained and prepared for positions of responsibility. After membership in the Guard, these men went to higher positions in society. This policy of bringing the intelligent and motivated young men into government early, then using the Guard as a conduit, gave them a sense of responsibility and access to higher positions in society; they had no reason to form or support insurrectionary movements.

As a result of these factors, the Fita Fita Guard was able to establish effective patterns of cooperation with the indigenous civil population it served. Even allowing for the easily controlled military setting and the absence of any real potential to develop an effective insurrectionary force, the Naval experience with the Guard is an example of the most successful of the five constabulary efforts reported here. The Navy Administration did develop an indigenous quasi-constabulary group which remained intact and effective for over fifty years--until the withdrawal of the U. S. Navy from Samoa in June 1951.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ Darden, op. cit., pp. 1-2.

Garde D'Haiti

Background⁶⁰

Historical Setting

For more than a hundred years prior to 1915, Haiti had been ruled by a succession of military chieftains and petty dictators who were able, by gaining control of the Haitian army, to take and maintain (albeit briefly in most cases) political control. Insurrection had become a normal facet of Haitian society; the conclusion of one insurrection marked the commencement of another. Every Haitian ruler from 1886 to 1915 had either been overturned or killed in office. The country was in social, economic, and political chaos. The Government was in a state of virtual bankruptcy--total government receipts for fiscal year 1912-1913 amounted to \$5,225,460.48 or about \$2.60 per capita. The national debt in 1915 was \$36,000,000. The large, predominantly Negro, peasant population, exploited by one ruling oligarchy or another, became accustomed to submitting rather passively to governments very little interested in their general welfare. The educational system was dominated by partisan political considerations, and educational facilities were totally inadequate. Sanitation laws, where they existed at all, were usually unenforced. Consequently, the vast majority of Haiti's 2,200,000 people felt little sense of national identity and evinced little trust in governmental institutions.

⁶⁰This descriptive material has been drawn from Harold P. Davis, Black Democracy (New York: Dodge Pub. Co., 1936); James H. McCrocklin, Garde D'Haiti 1915-1934 (Annapolis: The U. S. Naval Institute, 1956). Arthur C. Millspaugh, Haiti Under American Control 1915-1930 (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1931); Clyde H. Metcalf, A History of the U.S. Marine Corps (N. Y.: Putnam's Sons, 1939) and Ludwell L. Montague, Haiti and the United States 1714-1938 (New York: Russell and Russell, 1966).

United States Intervention Program

Following the mob violence which resulted in the brutal slaying of the Haitian President Guillaume Sam on 27 July 1915, the United States fearing the complete collapse of Haiti, the probability that Haiti would default on its financial obligations, and the possibility of increased European intervention in Haiti, intervened on 28 July. This intervention, with two companies of Marines and three companies of Navy forces, was designed primarily to stabilize the traditional Haitian system by "reactivating and renewing it."⁶¹ Although the intervention, which led to a full-scale occupation for twenty years (1915-1934), was explained in terms of the need to protect foreign legations and American property, and to preserve order, American action:

... particularly in its manifestation during and after the presidential election, was more than an intervention or interposition for the protection of American lives and property. It speedily became a political intervention and a military occupation intended not only to put an end to a situation which had become intolerable, but also to create in Haiti the conditions essential to permanent stability.⁶²

Specifically, the occupation was designed to:

1. stabilize the political system by disarming the population and reshaping the police-army on nonpolitical and technically professional lines, and by improving public administration particularly in sanitary organization, public education and public works.

⁶¹ Leslie F. Manigat, Haiti of the Sixties, Object of International Concern (Washington: The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, 1964), p. 34.

⁶² Millspaugh, op. cit., p. 61

2. establish social stability by favoring and reinforcing the supremacy of the light-skinned elite.
3. restore economic stability by substituting American for European preponderance in production, banking, and trade. Financial stability was to be established by maintaining a fixed exchange rate between the Haitian gourde and the dollar.⁶³

Initially, the intervention was unopposed, and the Haitians seemed ready to cooperate with the occupying U. S. forces. The population made little active effort to resist the occupation and by July 29th the American forces began, apparently with the cooperation of prominent Haitian leaders, to disarm the Haitian population.

One of the first acts of the U. S. forces was the abolishment of the large Haitian standing Army that had become a serious burden to the development of the country. This act and the subsequent creation of a Haitian constabulary had the following immediate result:

The weighty incubus of soldier's wages was lifted from the treasury; thousands of men were deprived of sinecures and put back into productive economic activities; the constant threat of armed revolution was removed; ... and since the army was no longer the great stepping stone to political office, the elite felt more secure from assault by ambitious but uneducated army men.⁶⁴

However, recognition of the extent of U. S. involvement in Haitian affairs and U. S. efforts to pressure Haitians into accepting a treaty that would make Haiti, in effect, a U. S. political and financial protectorate began to produce serious resentment of the U. S. effort.

⁶³Manigat, op. cit., p. 34.

⁶⁴James G. Leyburn, The Haitian People (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1941), p. 102.

In fact,

... all hope of genuine cooperation had been destroyed partly by Secretary Lansing, who demanded that the Haitians accept without discussion a treaty more extreme than anything they had been led to anticipate and simultaneously directed the Navy to take over certain functions without waiting for Haitian consent, and partly by Admiral Caperton, who, largely on his own initiative, transformed a temporary interposition at Port-au-Prince into a formal and unlimited occupation of the entire republic.⁶⁵

Gradually, even those Haitians who had been quite sympathetic to the U. S. occupation began to view the growing reliance by the American forces on military measures and the unlimited extension of the occupation over the entire country with distrust and fear. The Haitians realized that "they found themselves confronting, not a simple landing to protect lives and property, but foreign military government."⁶⁶ The treaty, which became effective in 1916 and was extended in 1917 for ten years, led essentially to the exclusion of Haitians from the process of government. This deeply wounded the pride of all Haitians. Haiti, a slave state that had successfully revolted against the whites, had been sovereign for 111 years; fear of a new white takeover was common among the people. The uniformed men patrolling their country indicated to them that they--the mulatto and the Negro--were again under the rule of the White Man.

⁶⁵ Montague, op. cit., p. 215.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 218.

Formation of the Constabulary

On 1 February 1916, the Commander of U. S. forces announced that henceforth all military and police functions would be performed by a constabulary (which became the Garde d'Haiti in 1938) supported by the U. S. expeditionary forces (the regular force). Article XI of the Gendarmerie Agreement, signed on 16 September 1915, directed that the Gendarmerie was to be under the control of the President of Haiti. In fact, however, the President appeared to have less power than the American Commander of the Marine regular forces, who frequently issued orders directly to the Chief of the Gendarmerie. Thus the Gendarmerie became primarily an extension of the U. S. occupation.

Organization

The Gendarmerie was divided into four geographical departments, with eighteen districts, numerous subdistricts, communes, and rural sections. This division corresponded closely to the political divisions of the country. The Chief of the Gendarmerie was a U. S. Marine Major General. The four departments were placed under the control of department commanders with the rank of colonel. The eighteen districts were each normally garrisoned by a company under the command of a captain. Small Gendarmerie detachments commanded by lieutenants were assigned to subdistricts.

Missions

The Gendarmerie was trained as a military force that would be capable of coping with the widespread caco banditry throughout the country. It was also responsible for the minutiae of public government, such as the following:

1. supervising arms control;
2. protecting and reporting on the condition of highways and bridges, and when ordered by the Commandant of the Gendarmerie, requiring inhabitants to alter and repair them;
3. protecting and reporting on the condition of telegraph and telephone lines, and under certain conditions, their censorship;
4. protecting and reporting on condition of public buildings;
5. reporting on and supervising use of public lands;
6. collecting vital statistics, including the census when ordered;
7. protecting and reporting on public irrigation works;
8. reporting on and enforcing regulations designed to prevent spread of animal diseases;
9. plenary control in times of great disorder following war, rebellion, earthquakes, typhoons, etc.;
10. control of prisons;
11. issuing permits for travel within the Republic;
12. reporting on agriculture;
13. seeing that all weights and measures conformed to legal standards;
14. enforcing harbor and docking regulations.⁶⁷

The Gendarmerie was also charged with the responsibility of maintaining order under a set of operating Haitian laws. These missions involved detecting crimes and infractions of the codes, making arrests, supervising

⁶⁷ McCrocklin, op. cit. pp. 90-92, 243-244.

local jails, and caring for prisoners. Further, Gendarmerie officers acted as Communal Advisors and were given broad powers to supervise the financial affairs of the local communal councils. To accomplish these missions the constabulary force was expanded by 1918 to a strength of 2, 500 Haitian enlisted men and 115 American officers.

Recruitment, Training and Difficulties Encountered

The development of a corps of officers able to establish rapport with the indigenous personnel under their command and with the civil population as a whole requires specialized training. Because of the requirements of World War I for competent officers, many low-ranking Marines, including privates with little or no training in how to cope with the complexities of operating in the Haitian environment, were made Gendarmerie officers. The lack of commitment of these young, untrained and frequently poorly disciplined men inhibited the development of a Gendarmerie officer cadre which would be able to effectively meet the challenges facing it. Few Marine officers had any familiarity with Haitian culture, history, customs, and peasant aspirations before their assignment; many were disdainful of Haitian culture, customs, and values. As a result, the treatment of peasants at the hands of the gendarmes was often irresponsible and sometimes brutal. However, although in many cases the behavior of U. S. officers in the gendarmes seems to have been more correct than that of the U. S. officers in the regular force, the average Haitian seems not to have drawn a distinction between them. The Marines in general exhibited many more acts of kindness than of cruelty, but the examples of poor behavior received much more attention and created a generally negative image.

To this problem were added the difficulties of recruiting and selecting Haitian gendarmes that were able and reliable. Special difficulties arose in getting young Haitians of good families to participate in such training.

For example, in 1920 Colonel Williams recounted his early experience with one group of possible officer recruits:

When asked to strip for a physical examination, most of them refused. When told to groom their horses, all refused, such manual labor being taboo among the Haitian elite. Some 20 young Haitians were eventually trained as officers and 5 were finally commissioned, but only 1 remained in the service. Of the other four, one was ousted for borrowing command funds, the second for bringing a suit in the civil courts against a man who had complained to the police against him, the third for diverting water from Fort Nationale to irrigate his garden and the fourth for debts.⁶⁸

All of the above aroused the Haitian population to resentment toward Americans and the occupation forces in general.

The following factors also seem to have adversely affected the progress of the gendarmes:

1. Few Marines spoke Creole or French, and therefore, there were difficulties in communicating. (Initially all commands and training instructions were given in English, which few Haitians understood.)
2. There was a high illiteracy rate among recruits.

⁶⁸Rayford W. Logan, "Haiti," in D. M. Condit, Bert H. Cooper, Jr., et al., (eds.) Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict. Supplement. (Washington, D. C.: Center for Research in Social Systems, 1968, pp. 31-57.

3. Haitian recruits were in extremely poor health. By actual blood tests it was estimated that ninety-five percent of the gendarmes had syphilis; a high percentage also had hookworms and other debilitating diseases.
4. Some American Gendarmerie officers and other American officials had biased racial attitudes. The initial assignment of Marines from Southern states on the mistaken assumption that Southerners would know how to deal effectively with Haitian Negroes was a serious error of judgment.⁶⁹
5. Prostitution increased substantially. The continuing presence of approximately 2,000 Marines resulted in an increase in the mulatto population. As Leyburn indicates "the light skin of resulting offspring suggested to many the possibility of a climb up the social ladder."⁷⁰ The lighter the skin, the greater the social mobility. The widespread illegitimacy became a source of Haitian complaint.

A rigid class system, or more properly, a caste system, prevented the development of mutual trust and cooperation between the largely black peasantry and the small colored (mulatto) and white upper classes. There seems to have been little in the way of a program to bring the elite into the Guard or to train them in attitudes of responsibility. The exclusion of members of the elite from the process of government and the failure to train them for responsible positions meant that little was done to prepare a body of trained, responsible officials capable of taking over the administration of the country once the occupying force was withdrawn.

During the period 1922-1929, as the Constabulary grew in size, experience, and discipline, the Marine Brigade was reduced to a

⁶⁹ Leyburn, op. cit., pp. 102-103, see especially footnote 4.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 104.

complement of approximately 500. This force was retained primarily as a reserve force to support the Garde in the event of an emergency. Nevertheless, few Haitian officers were trained; Haitianization of the Garde made little progress until 1934, when President Roosevelt, following the intent of the Good Neighbor Policy, terminated the occupation.

The Caco Revolt

Perhaps the biggest blunder the U. S. made was the revival in 1916 of an old corvée law which permitted the conscription of labor for road building purposes.⁷¹ Under the supervision of the Gendarmerie, the mayors of the locales where road construction was to be started supplied lists of the people in their jurisdictions. Using these lists, the Gendarmerie drew up and delivered "notification cards" directing people conscripted to report to designated work sites. Individuals who chose not to work were to pay a specified tax. Naturally, because the peasants were extremely poor, few could pay the tax and thus were forced to work.

At first, and as long as the corvée law was reasonably enforced, Haitians did not actively oppose the system. But as the corvée progressed, undisciplined enforcement of the law by the gendarmes led to many abuses. The gendarmes frequently brutalized the laborers, treating them like criminals. Further, the Haitian gendarmes accepted bribes and embezzled money given to them to provide for the social and physical welfare of the corvée laborers.⁷² Perhaps the most objectionable aspect of

⁷¹Dr. Carl Kelsey, quoted in McCrocklin, op. cit., p. 216.

⁷²Ibid., p. 96.

the system was the practice of taking many workers considerable distance from their homes and requiring them to work beyond the legal limit.

The corvée system, from the standpoint of the goals of the U. S. occupation, produced several negative results: (1) widespread resentment of the system and particularly of the Marines and gendarmes responsible for enforcing it,⁷³ causing a dramatic increase in anti-Americanism; (2) the rampant growth of stories of atrocities--often exaggerated--leading to the flight of many peasants to the hills where they became ready recruits for caco units--the caco leaders played on the abuses of the corvée and spread propaganda that the whites (blancs) were attempting to re-establish slavery;⁷⁴ (3) an organized caco uprising in June 1918, ably led by Charlemagne Peralte.

The negative effects of the corvée system on the Gendarmerie's image and its relationship with the civil populace cannot be overemphasized. Marine officers and the gendarmes responsible for its enforcement, "instead of being regarded as friends to the Haitians, which was the real purpose of the intervention," were viewed by many Haitians as tyrants.⁷⁵ Although the corvée system was officially abolished by 1 October 1918, its residual effects hindered the civil efforts of the Gendarmerie to gain the trust and cooperation of the Haitian peasants.

The caco revolt was a massive blow to the success of U. S. intervention. Begun in 1918, the revolt became so widespread that by the spring of 1919 the Gendarmerie was unable to deal effectively with

⁷³ Metcalf, op. cit., p. 393.

⁷⁴ Davis, op. cit., p. 218.

⁷⁵ Metcalf, op. cit., p. 393.

the rebel force of some 5,000 in the northern and central districts. Consequently, the Chief of the Gendarmerie requested the assistance of the Marine forces to suppress the uprising. One result of the Gendarmerie's inability to control the revolt was its further loss of prestige among the civilian population. The Marines did most of the subsequent fighting. The Constabulary did little to gain respect. "Most of the people still distrusted the gendarmes because they were prone to use their authority to impose upon and exact tribute from them--in spite of the efforts of American officers."⁷⁶ The U. S. occupation authorities employed martial law to contain the discontent. Courts-martial were used to silence local press criticism of the American occupation.⁷⁷ This did not seem to solve the problem, however.

Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations

After the suppression of the caco revolt in 1921, the Gendarmerie began to show marked progress in spite of the shortcomings mentioned above. Under Marine leadership, discipline, training, and morale improved, as did the behavior of gendarmes in their contact with the civil population. By 1922, the Gendarmerie had been reorganized and beefed up to a strength of 2,700. Under Gendarmerie supervision the rural police system was broadened and by 1924 was rather extensive. The Constabulary established and maintained many programs that today would be included as parts of a comprehensive civil affairs program. Its activities in the areas of public works and public health were particularly extensive. Some of the efforts of the Guard in Civil Affairs are described below.

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 401.

⁷⁷ Logan, op. cit., p. 41.

Public Finance

One practice which brought on bitter resentment from the Haitians was the assignment and functioning of Gendarmerie officers as Communal Advisors. On August 10, 1917, Gendarmerie officers were given advisory authority to make monthly audits of the financial accounts of the communes and to suggest improvements in money allocation.⁷⁸ In practice, the officers became much more than advisors. Haitians resented the presence of American officers at the communal board meetings and their authority to decide where, how, and how much money was to be spent. In effect, the Gendarmerie "advisor" became the "superior authority" with regard to practically all local matters, having the final say.⁷⁹ Although Haitian complaints about the use of the Gendarmerie to maintain local control were sometimes exaggerated, they were often based on real abuses of the Gendarmerie's authority and on the objection that such intervention in local affairs was not authorized by the Treaty.⁸⁰

Legal

Still another objectionable practice was the use of provost courts growing out of the imposition of martial law and the tendency of the Gendarmerie to rule on civil cases outside its jurisdiction. Such judicial abuses were fairly common and the Haitian complaints were often justified.⁸¹

⁷⁸ McCrocklin, op. cit., p. 129.

⁷⁹ Emily G. Balch (ed.), Occupied Haiti (New York: The Writers' Publishing Company, Inc., 1927), p. 133.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 133

⁸¹ McCrocklin, op. cit., p. 138.

Community Relations

On balance, although the Haitian Constabulary did not employ what today would be considered a community relations program as such, its activities over the entire period of U. S. occupation did contribute to an improvement of relations with the population and the growth of a positive image of the Constabulary. Because it was a mixed force composed largely of Haitians, the Constabulary was able to build a more constructive relationship with the Haitian population than the Marine Brigade.

Public Works

In 1915 approximately only 210 miles of road were operable.⁸² A road construction program was first undertaken as part of a comprehensive public works program established soon after the occupation in 1915. By 1930, a road system of approximately 1,000 miles had been developed under the supervision of the constabulary.⁸³ The construction of roads and other public works projects were planned to alleviate the unemployment problem which had been an important contributing factor in the general disorders threatening the country. Until the formation of a Department of Public Works, the Constabulary played a central role in the expansion of public works programs.

Education

Marine constabulary officers were instrumental in supervising the construction of a number of schools in the rural areas. Because the Gendarmerie was able to control the payment of teachers' wages, it

⁸² Millspaugh, op. cit., p. 19.

⁸³ Metcalf, op. cit., p. 392.

attempted, with considerable success, to improve the attendance rate of teachers and their attitudes toward their pupils. These Haitian schools were established throughout the country in 1922 primarily for the purpose of enhancing the general educational level of the Haitian members of the Constabulary.

Public Health

During the formative period of the Constabulary, efforts to improve sanitary conditions were hampered by the population, who regarded the attempt to force their habits and attitudes toward health and sanitation as an encroachment on personal liberties and a threat to the freedom to regulate their own lives.⁸⁴ Gradually, as the Constabulary was able to demonstrate both the need for sanitation measures and the positive effects stemming from their enforcement, much of this resistance was overcome.

Basically, the medical service of the Constabulary assisted the Navy medical service in maintaining a public health service which operated a number of hospitals and free public clinics. The clinics treated approximately 50,000 people per month.⁸⁵ In addition, the Constabulary was responsible for enforcing sanitary regulations and supervising sanitary engineering projects. It also assisted in the inspection of public markets, supervised refuse removal, and was instrumental in the enforcement of other public health measures.

⁸⁴ McCrocklin, op. cit., p. 34.

⁸⁵ Metcalf, op. cit., p. 401.

Agriculture

Arable land and land under tree crops constituted about 13 percent of the total area, permanent meadows and pastures about 13 percent, and forested land about 25 percent.⁸⁶ The streams overflow their banks during the rainy seasons, which occur twice a year. The breakup of the plantation system in the 19th Century made Haiti a small-scale agricultural country in which the peasants "farmed their tiny plots by primitive methods to eke out a bare subsistence."⁸⁷

It was not until 1921 that serious efforts were made to cope with Haiti's many agricultural problems. The Constabulary carried out irrigation projects and assisted in restoring old facilities and in constructing new ones.⁸⁸ In addition, Marine officers in the Gendarmerie established an agricultural school.

Grievance System

A grievance policy was established early. Every letter, it is said, was answered and every kind of civil complaint was investigated. This policy produced wide response; the populace registered its complaints, verbally and by letter, about the Gendarmerie's actions, the behavior of civil officials, and virtually everything else that occurred to them. According to one source, "where complaints seemed justified, Gendarmerie officers moved quickly and decisively to take corrective

⁸⁶ Committee on Latin American Studies, Statistical Abstracts of Latin America for 1957 (Los Angeles: UCLA, 1959), p. 3.

⁸⁷ Logan, op. cit., p. 35.

⁸⁸ Metcalf, op. cit., p. 392.

action."⁸⁹ (In view of reports of un insightful policies from many other historical sources, the authors of this report find it difficult to believe that the grievance system worked as well as McCrocklin claimed.) This policy may have helped to improve the image of the Constabulary, particularly in the latter stages of the occupation, and to reduce the negative impact produced by the Gendarmerie's earlier behavior in its enforcement of the corvée and other situations. It would undoubtedly have been more successful if it had been reinforced by a planned program of communications.

Intelligence from the Population

In the formative period of the Constabulary, intelligence gathering resources were inadequate because of a lack of rapport with the Haitian peasantry. As the Constabulary matured, however, a number of techniques were employed. Personal histories and records of prominent citizens and dissidents were recorded and up-dated periodically. This system permitted the Gendarmerie to maintain adequate surveillance of troublesome elements.⁹⁰ The Gendarmerie also made extensive use of gendarmes and civilians carefully selected for their loyalty and intelligence as information gatherers in bandit areas. It quickly became obvious to Gendarmerie officers that patrols could obtain reliable information from friendly citizens who knew the areas that were patrolled by the Gendarmerie and who could be persuaded to accompany them. Because such trusted local inhabitants knew which elements of the local population could be trusted and were able to identify bandit

⁸⁹ McCrocklin, op. cit., p. 136.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 181.

leaders and sympathizers, they were extremely helpful to Gendarmerie units.⁹¹ Further, some Gendarmerie officers recognized the potential of the cock-fighting ring or district gaguere as a source of intelligence, since it was a Haitian social institution and a kind of gossip and information exchange center.

Psychological Operations

Much of the Constabulary's positive work in public works could have been assisted and amplified by a planned program of communications. Certainly the activities of the Gendarmerie in attempting to restore stability, to generate civic pride, to improve sanitary conditions, and to hear grievances can be viewed as having potentially a psychological impact. But these positive acts seem to have had much less influence on Haitian attitudes and behavior than the lack of sensitivity and abuses mentioned earlier. Perhaps the most important influence on Haitian attitudes and behavior was the long military occupation itself, which had a negative effect on the attitudes of lower and upper classes.

Amnesty Program

As early as March 1919, in one rebel-infested district, priests and market women relayed the message to the cacos that all insurgents "who surrendered to the authorities would be protected and paid for their weapons."⁹² Many Haitian rebels turned in their guns for the modest payment which was offered; in turn, they received from Marine officers signed passes designating them as law-abiding citizens. Later a general amnesty was extended to all insurgents except those who were

⁹¹Ibid., p. 108.

⁹²Logan, op. cit., p. 48.

escaped convicts and fugitives from justice. In the last ten months of the insurgency more than 11,000 cacos and 165 lesser caco chiefs surrendered through this amnesty program.⁹³

Part of the success of this amnesty program may be attributed to the clever ruse and intrepid daring of Gendarmerie Capt. H. H. Hannekin (Sergeant, USMC). Sergeant Hannekin, with a small group, infiltrated the armed camp of the caco leader Peralte, shot and killed Peralte and escaped with the dead leader's body and valuable rebel records.⁹⁴

While the killing of Peralte did not bring the caco revolt to an end, it contributed importantly, as did the destruction of charismatic leaders in similar operations against rebellious elements elsewhere.⁹⁵

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 42.

⁹⁵ This experience is in some ways similar to an operation conducted by 4th Psyop Group and the Vietnamese 50th POLWAR battalion in Viet-Nam in June 1968. The Viet Cong Quyet Thang regiment infiltrated Gia Dinh province around Saigon on May 31. Rebel pockets were being slowly reduced by conventional operations with psyop assistance. On the afternoon of June 17 the unit's deputy commander rallied, carrying an Allied surrender leaflet. He recorded a surrender appeal urging his former subordinates to defect. By noon the next day more than 100 members of the regiment, the preponderance of the surviving VC effectives, had surrendered. Communist political indoctrination with all its emphasis on cause does not always maintain cohesion in groups under stress. The summary by Captain Capers G. Barr III, Group Psyop Development Center Plans officer, of the situation, and of the purpose of the Gia Dinh operation might have applied equally well to the amnesty program in Haiti. "There is a psychological moment when the enemy is demoralized and disillusioned. His leadership is gone and he has lost contact with the rest of his forces. There is no doubt that he could continue to fight and take his toll of Allied dead and wounded... our job is to give the enemy an alternative: surrender." (Scott M. Manning, "Mass Defection at Gia Dinh," Credibilis, July 1968, p. 5.)

Recapitulation

A number of civil affairs activities contributed to the general improvement of physical conditions. But like many other efforts of the occupation, their effect in improving political maturity or developing a leadership class was limited. American officers and officials did not "recognize the social situation and its implications; or realizing them, did not consider them worthy of attention."⁹⁶ As Leyburn indicates:

Roads, telephones, mail service, and improved agricultural methods seemed patently desirable to progressive Americans, to install them for the Haitians seemed generously wise. Yet many well-meant efforts came to grief, for the mass of people, lacking a tradition of orderly free government did not always understand what the Americans were about, while the elite saw in the activities of the Marines a threat to their own dominance as rulers of the country.⁹⁷

In fact, a majority of:

...literate Haitians passionately insisted that the policy pursued by the U. S. in Haiti was most emphatically counter to their national aspirations. Even to those of the Haitians who in 1915 approved of the armed intervention of the U. S., the manner in which we attempted to solve their problems was never welcome.⁹⁸

Many Haitians objected to the military character of the Constabulary and accused it and the Marine forces of "fostering" rather than "eliminating" military psychology among the Haitian people.⁹⁹ In retrospect, it is

⁹⁶Leyburn, op. cit., p. 107.

⁹⁷Ibid.

⁹⁸Davis, op. cit., p. 279.

⁹⁹Leyburn, op. cit., pp. 102-103.

apparent that continuation of control of civilian matters by military forces provided a poor mode of developing political maturity among Haitians.

One Notable Exception

The activities¹⁰⁰ of one U. S. Marine Sergeant, Faustin Wirkus, on the Haitian Island of La Gonave are particularly interesting as an example of how knowledge of indigenous culture, tact, empathy, and imagination can be combined to establish effective relations with foreign populations.

Although Wirkus was told, after he was assigned on 15 April 1925 as resident subdistrict commander of La Gonave, that his primary mission was military and not civil, he viewed his mission as essentially civil. Believing that his superiors "never thought it worthwhile to understand how the native mind took impressions and how the native mind answered such impressions,"¹⁰¹ Wirkus, in effect, redefined his mission and began, after researching the island civilization, its peoples, and customs, a rather comprehensive program oriented toward the civil populace.

Paying careful attention to local behavior codes and lines of traditional authority, Wirkus developed an equitable island tax system, a plan for protection of the population from official persecution, and a number of civic action measures. Wirkus' stated aim was to "show the people how a white man could help them to live better and more happily,

¹⁰⁰ Faustin Wirkus, The White King of La Gonave (Garden City, N. Y.: Garden City Publishing Company, 1935).

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 22.

and at the same time not interfere with their inherited manners and customs."¹⁰²

Wirkus set an example by working with the natives (Haitian peasants were accustomed to their local officials giving orders from the sidelines), by benevolent treatment of prisoners, by just treatment of all natives, and by his efforts to end official corruption. He recognized that Haitians worked best as members of a team, and that group efforts improved the efficiency of individual efforts. Although voodooism was illegal, Wirkus realized its religious function and its importance as a cohesive force and overlooked its practice. In addition, he was particularly interested in the traditional Congo societies on the island and the ways the societies could be

...brought into working cooperation with the system of combined tax collection and rent collection of the government and its concessionaires and how--with the aid of the society--we could best preserve law and order, without constantly confusing the people with new laws as to what they could not do.¹⁰³

Wirkus' careful study of the Congo societies and his efforts to develop rapport with their leaders resulted in productive alliances and the development of close personal relationships between him and traditional leaders.

Wirkus' efforts were greatly facilitated by the spiritual reputation that he gained, largely as a result of the fact that his first name, Faustin, happened to be the same as a respected Haitian King--King Faustin Soulougué I. Wirkus never denied his mystical preeminence

¹⁰²Ibid., p. 238.

¹⁰³Ibid., p. 218.

and even capitalized on it on occasion:

If believing I was a mystic working out of the will of their gods made the people think more of me, I saw no reason to explain that I was no such thing. For their belief in me--no matter what the reason--was half the battle in helping them to help themselves.¹⁰⁴

Eventually Wirkus was crowned King Faustin II and became the first white man ever to hold any office in La Gonave.¹⁰⁵

Because of a lack of materials, it is difficult to give a balanced evaluation of the efforts of Wirkus. But it is obvious that he was able to develop highly effective patterns of rapport, communication, and cooperation with the people of La Gonave and consequently was able to maintain order, assist the development of civic pride, and improve the general conditions on the island. Certainly, his own experience demonstrated:

...how much could be accomplished by leaving a man alone to study the people and make up his mind how they were to be helped to help themselves, rather than driven into doing things according to the rules and regulations of outsiders who had no understanding of them at all.¹⁰⁶

Summary and Conclusions

Looking back from 1968, recognizing some discrepancies in historical accounts, it seems clear that the total impact of this U. S. effort was more negative than positive.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 212.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 235.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 240.

Among the negative factors are the following:

- The occupation began badly. The U. S. insisted on a much tougher treaty than was necessary, thus alienating the Haitian elite.
- The troops sent in were untrained for the mission.
- The commanders and personnel failed to recognize or to be sensitive to racial prejudice and fears of the Haitians.
- Occupation plans failed to take local customs into account or to build on them.
- The corvée system was supported until accumulating evidence showed the problems it produced, which should have been anticipated initially.
- Contrary to the stated U. S. mission and to the original plan, the constabulary made only a few efforts to institute a program to bring in and train the elite; no really enlightened program was instituted, and the efforts made were unsuccessful.
- Rather than use local authority centers or councils to develop social solidarity, taxation and fund allocation systems, the U. S. forces took over the authority themselves. Thus, educational benefits that might have accrued from participation were denied; the opportunities latent in such requirements to establish a sense of community solidarity--a "we feeling"--was lost.
- The Constabulary failed to exploit the psychological impact of the public works which it conducted and promoted.
- Very little was done to remove the language barrier.
- The Guard instituted provost courts which decided cases outside their jurisdiction.
- The Guard failed to appreciate that natives worked more effectively in groups; Wirkus used this factor effectively.

- Apparently there was a failure to supervise adequately the relations of the Constabulary with the people; such supervision could have checked the brutality and other abuses.
- Generally the improvements made were those that the U. S. thought the Haitians needed--not necessarily the needs as seen by the Haitians.
- There was a failure to make use of an institutional memory to learn lessons evident from successful occupation of the Philippines and Samoa.

On the positive side, there were several accomplishments. The U. S.:

1. Improved and extended the road network.
2. Improved public health measures and practices.
3. Worked to improve agriculture.
4. Instituted a grievance system.
5. Instigated a reasonably effective intelligence system.

An image, once formed, is difficult to reverse, and people make generalizations from an image. Although there was considerable activity in the areas just above, the overall image created by the U. S. occupation was a negative one. Generally there were not enough positive measures to counteract it. Wirkus' accomplishments, although an exception, suggest how much more might have been done by a more insightful approach.

The U. S. brought some of the material trappings of a technically advanced culture to an underdeveloped one, but the political objectives involved in doing so were almost completely overlooked. The objectives of bringing about social harmony, law, and order, and controlling the inhabitants via local leadership and use of local customs, were grossly neglected. Although the U. S. occupation lasted nineteen years,

little was gained by the Haitians in the way of appreciation of the democratic process. Objectives such as stabilizing the political system by improving public administration and by bringing the elite into the system were not systematically or effectively pursued.

The departure of Marine forces was hailed as Haiti's second emancipation. The Marine-trained Garde d'Haiti, which became the decisive force in Haitian politics, soon restored Negro domination to Haiti's political system. Today and for the last eleven years Haiti has been ruled by an autocratic dictator, "Papa Doc" Duvalier, whose guard is employed to maintain his position.

The Guardia Nacional of Nicaragua

Background

After gaining independence from Spain in 1821, Nicaragua entered a protracted period of internal discord and revolutionary instability. Deep-rooted conflict between the Conservative and Liberal parties, based respectively in Granada (center of the aristocratic class) and Leon (center of a large artisan and small landholding class) began in 1821 and continued unabated until 1925.¹⁰⁷ The bitterness between the two parties contributed to 16 revolutions during 1900-1910 alone. In the year following the withdrawal of the U. S. Marine legation guard, the two parties edged toward civil war in a series of rebellions. Early in 1927 a peace settlement was negotiated at Tipitapa, largely through the efforts of Henry L. Stimson, and the Liberal and Conservative forces agreed to disarm. Under the treaty's terms, the army was to disband and amnesty would be granted to all dissident elements. Most of the rebel elements did disarm, but Augusto Sandino, a dissatisfied Liberal leader, refused, and in May 1927, with a force of some 200 hard-core insurgents, he withdrew to the protection of the densely forested northern areas.

On May 8, 1927, because the Nicaraguan government was completely unable to deal with Sandino's threat and the growing incidence of banditry, President Diaz called on the U. S. for assistance. He requested the appointment of American officers to train and command a reinforced Constabulary, to be called the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua.

¹⁰⁷ U. S. Dept. of State, The U. S. and Nicaragua--A Survey of the Relations from 1901-1932. Latin American Series, No. 6. (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1932).

Underlying this request was the hope that stability in Nicaragua might be gained by substituting a well-trained nonpartisan military and police force for the ill-trained, undisciplined and corrupt Nicaraguan armed forces.¹⁰⁸

Formation of the Guard

Organization

The U. S. State Department drafted a plan for a Constabulary that would be:

...organized, armed, equipped and trained as a military police with the object of replacing entirely the existing Army/Navy and National police of Nicaragua. And it would be treated as a National institution free from political influence and used for the sole purpose of maintaining peace and order.¹⁰⁹

This constabulary would be the sole military and police force of Nicaragua, trained and commanded by U. S. Marine officers. Its Marine Commander would be responsible to the President of Nicaragua; the U. S. Marine Brigade, also to be stationed in Nicaragua, would be responsible to the President of the U. S. The Guard and the Marine Brigade were to operate independently of each other except when emergencies required joint action.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸ Ralph S. Keyser, "Constabularies for Central America," Marine Corps Gazette, XI (June 1926), p. 89.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 92

¹¹⁰ Julian Smith, et al., A Review of the Organization and Operations of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua. n.d., n.p.

To permit maximum control by the Guard, the country was divided into military areas and departments in which the Guard commanders were given the responsibility of providing measures for both local defense and offensive operations against bandit forces.¹¹¹ The Guard Commander's control was channeled through four area commanders and four independent department commanders. A department generally comprised the geographical area that lay within the boundaries of the corresponding political departments of provinces; a military area comprised two or more departments. Managua, the capital city, was made a separate department under the supervision of the Guard Commander.¹¹²

Missions

Under the Guardia Agreement signed on 22 December 1927, the Guard was assigned the following missions:

1. Preserving domestic peace and security of individual rights--protecting life and property; suppressing contraband activities; suppressing the illicit manufacture of intoxicants; enforcing police, traffic, and sanitary regulations; controlling jueces de la mesta (justices of the peace), jefes de canton (collectors of fines) and capitanes de canada (Indian chiefs in the outlying districts); compiling monthly reports on fines imposed by the civil judiciary for violations of the penal code or police, traffic, and sanitary regulations; and compiling a monthly report of contraband seized.

¹¹¹ Ibid., p. 35.

¹¹² Capt. Evans F. Carlson, "The Guardia Nacional Nicaragua," The Marine Corps Gazette, XXI (August 1937), p. 9.

2. Controlling arms, ammunition, and military supplies, and supervising the traffic therein throughout the Republic.
3. Controlling all government property--including prisons, penitentiaries, vessels, and other government property used by the forces of the Republic.
4. Furnishing a guard of honor for the Palace of the President.
5. Training Nicaraguan officers to eventually replace the U. S. officers assigned to the Guard.

The Guard's initial efforts consisted of training, some police work in the pacified areas of the country, and joint operations with Marine patrols; there were 49 contacts with the rebel forces by November 1928.¹¹³ Although its aggregate strength had by then reached 2,000, it was still unable to commit substantial forces to the insurgent-infested areas of the North.¹¹⁴ The newly elected Nicaraguan President and the new Commander of the National Guard both supported more active use of the Guard, and sped up its training and preparation to assume its full duties as the sole police and military force of the Republic. It was hoped that the populace in the insurgent areas, which had not cooperated with members of the Marine Brigade, would be more responsive to Guard forces in their efforts to root out the dissidents.

At this time two armed civilian groups were created under the supervision of the Guard. The first class consisted of volunteer local self-defense units; their arms were kept by the Guard and were issued at the time of operations. This group was used to good advantage at a

¹¹³Smith, op. cit., p. 306.

¹¹⁴Metcalf, op. cit.

number of stations in the bandit areas to reinforce Guard garrisons during emergencies and to assist Guard patrols.¹¹⁵

The second class of citizens was composed of men employed by private firms as guards. The private guards were registered as civicos to ensure Guard control and to permit their use in emergencies; they were issued rifles which they kept in their possession.¹¹⁶

To accomplish the Guard's primary mission, the suppression of insurgency and banditry: four plans were considered.

1. Closing the border with Honduras;
2. Concentrating all guard forces in an offensive to destroy the main bandit groups.
3. Garrisoning all towns and valuable properties, public and private, to protect them against bandits.
4. Some combination of 2 and 3.

Initially, the garrisoning plan was judged most feasible. It would provide security to critical points, permit the growth of popular confidence in the Guard as security was established, enable local merchants to carry on normal activities, and provide protection for foreign property; it would also provide police protection and local internal security.¹¹⁷

The plan's primary weakness was its essentially passive and defensive nature; the insurgents retained the initiative. In choosing it, offensive operations had been weakened, and forces had to be continually

¹¹⁵Smith, op. cit., p. 17.

¹¹⁶Ibid., p. 17.

¹¹⁷Ibid., p. 33.

drawn from the defensive operations to support them. It soon became evident that "a complete defense of the entire country by this means was not only not the best method of combating banditry, but was an impossibility with the forces that the Nicaraguan Government was able to put in the field."¹¹⁸

To assist the Guard in performing its police functions, and to free additional Guard forces for garrisoning strategic points and for offensive operations, local police (Guardia Municipal) were formed by and incorporated into the Guard. Members of the Guardia Municipal were enlisted for a period of one year and were assigned to the area from which they were recruited to provide local security and perform normal local police duties. Although the municipalities incurred the cost of these forces, they were paid through the National Guard. Establishment of the Guardia Municipal thus made the municipalities financially responsible for their own police protection; yet, as an integral part of the Nation Guard, its nonpartisan control was assured.¹¹⁹ By August 1929, all but 10 posts in the northern areas had been turned over to the Guardia Municipal; it included 17 stations manned by 609 men in the northern areas, 17 stations with 414 men in the central area, and 15 stations with 257 men in the eastern area.¹²⁰

In 1930, at the request of President Moncada, another group of auxiliaries was created and placed under the control of the Guard. This group, which reached a force level of 300, was composed of short-term enlisted men--unpaid civilian militiamen. Auxiliary units, equipped

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p. 34.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., p. 16.

¹²⁰ Metcalf, op. cit., p. 439.

and commanded by the National Guard, fought effectively alongside the Guard in 1931 and 1932.¹²¹

Thus, the strategy finally adopted by the Guard combined active defense of critical areas with offensive operations--a concept similar to that underlying the strategy described for U. S. Marine and Vietnamese Popular Forces Combined Action Platoons (see section following). The Nicaraguan plan was partly the outgrowth of circumstances and partly the result of deliberate planning based on the realities of the situation.

Relations Between U. S. and Nicaraguan Guardsmen

The selection and recruitment of the Guard's rank and file was not based on their quality and honesty; the sole criterion was loyalty.¹²² This factor is believed to have contributed both to the Guard's abuse of the civil population and to its inefficient functioning.

Perhaps the most critical factor in the training of the Guard was the poor preparation of its U. S. officers. Any situation involving the introduction of foreign troops into a country, and the stationing of them in rural areas for long periods of time, presents communications problems that have implications for attempts to gain the cooperation, support and compliance of the indigenous population. There was no systematic pre-commitment or on-going training in the Spanish language, Nicaraguan values, attitudes, customs, sensitivities, etc. In Nicaragua, these unmet needs were greatly accentuated because:

¹²¹Smith, op. cit., p. 17.

¹²²Charles E. Frazier, Jr., The Dawn of Nationalism and its Consequences in Nicaragua. Ph. D. Dissertation, The University of Texas, 1958.

...the U. S. was coming into contact with a people who were by tradition sensitive and proud. The contact between them was the contact and clash of two highly different cultures which did not understand each other and which did not seek to understand each other.¹²³

A number of Marine officers in the Guard failed to recognize and deal successfully with the intense pride, personal honor, sensitivity to criticism, and other factors affecting the behavior of the Nicaraguan Guardsmen. Because U. S. personnel were placed in command positions, a certain amount of resentment was inevitable; but the Americans' lack of language skills and their insensitivity to Nicaraguan cultural traditions certainly deepened this resentment.

One factor did influence positively the development of a cooperative relationship between some Americans and the Nicaraguan members of the Guard. The American officers shared with Nicaraguan Guardsmen the rigorous hardships of extended field duty; they fought together, lived together, and shared the same food. As a result they usually developed strong bonds of comradeship and loyalty which facilitated the operations of the Guard. The example set by many Marine officers contributed substantially to the development of close relationships between Americans and elements of the Guard. Chester Puller's leadership of Company M is a case in point: his total devotion to the Nicaraguans in his company, his understanding of their sensitivities, and the personal example he set earned him the respect and confidence of his men.¹²⁴

¹²³Lejeune Cummins, Quijote on a Burro (Mexico: Privately Published, 1958).

¹²⁴Carlson, op. cit., pp. 7-20.

Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations

Although the importance of civil affairs and psychological operations as command areas was not recognized at the time of the Nicaraguan intercession, the Guard performed several functions which today would be classed in those areas.

Civil Government Interface

The policy of the Guard in its relationship with Nicaraguan civil officials consisted of seven major points:

1. Maintaining the nonpartisan character of the Guard.
2. Giving the fullest cooperation to the civil authorities, and insisting upon reciprocal actions toward the Guard.
3. Avoiding interference with the civil officials' performance of the functions of their office.
4. Demanding noninterference on the part of the civil officials with the interior administration of the Guard.
5. Requiring all requests for cooperation on the part of the civil officials to be made to the Commanding Officer of the Guard and not permitting any civil official to deal directly with the enlisted personnel of the Guard.
6. Requiring all Guard complaints against civil officials to be couched in temperate language and confined strictly to a statement of facts based upon a full and complete investigation.
7. Cultivating a feeling of mutual respect and cooperation between the officer of the Guard and the civil officials of the Government on a basis of mutual independence of one another.¹²⁵

¹²⁵Smith, op. cit., p. 62.

However, these principles were not strictly adhered to by the Guard, nor were civil officials always cooperative.

In areas where civilian courts existed, Guard officers on police duty were frequently frustrated in their attempts to prosecute offenders. Native judges showed their personal opposition to the American intervention by attempting to impede the American's supervision of the Guard and by refusing to sentence--or, in some cases, to even arraign--suspects arrested by Guard officers. During 1931-1932, the police in Managua arrested 1,097 people, of whom only three were subsequently convicted.¹²⁶

A court-martial system based on U. S. Naval law was established in 1929 and caused considerable resentment. A public outcry occurred after it was announced that the leaders of two mutinies in October 1929 were to be tried by a court-martial board composed almost entirely of American Guard officers. The trial of Nicaraguan civilians by U. S. Naval court martial was interpreted by Nicaraguans as an insult. It stirred anti-U. S. sentiments in Nicaragua and provided ammunition to those who voiced them; in retrospect, it was a mistake.

Community Relations.

Although no formal community relations program was instituted, instructions were given to insure that "every effort will be made to gain the respect, confidence, and friendship of the people."¹²⁷ But Guard units frequently claimed that they were "outside the pale of the Constitution,"¹²⁸ and despite efforts to ensure proper conduct and respect

¹²⁶ Carlson, op. cit., p. 15.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Frazier, op. cit., p. 401.

for the civil rights of Nicaraguan citizens, abuses occurred and were dramatized by insurgent propaganda. A Guard Order issued in 1931 governing the "Treatment of Rural Inhabitants" indicates both the problems and the attention paid, at the highest levels of the Guard, to the interface between the Guard and the civilian populace:

Practically all the rural inhabitants of this area, particularly those living near the unsettled sections are subject to bandit attacks and depredations, which it is impossible for the Guardia to completely prevent. Many of these inhabitants, no matter where their real sympathies may lie are compelled, for fear of their lives, to maintain a friendly attitude toward the bandits. Every effort will be made to assure them of the friendliness of the Guardia toward all peaceable citizens and to extend such protection as will enable them to carry on peaceful occupations without molestation, and to accumulate property without fear of robbery. No effort will be spared to demonstrate the advantages of law and order and to secure their cooperation. In no case will their property be taken without proper compensation and even then care must be exercised to see that they are left with sufficient quantities for their needs, and that their breeding stocks of fowls and livestock are not depleted.¹²⁹

These efforts and the care exercised in procuring supplies, labor and property did contribute to improved community relations.

Civic Action

A comprehensive plan for conducting civic action did not exist. Civic action consisted primarily of a road construction project begun in the summer of 1929. Marine officers of the Guard, feeling that the bandits would abandon their efforts if they could obtain other means of financial support, suggested the establishment of a road building program.

¹²⁹Quoted in Smith, op. cit., p. 414.

All persons who applied were to be given work, and a general amnesty was to be extended to all insurgents who desired to participate in the project. Accordingly, although the program did not receive much support from the State Department or the Nicaraguan government, Guard forces began to test their "unemployment thesis" by hiring insurgents at a rate of 50 cents per day per laborer. Within a month, 125 former insurgents had begun constructing roads under the supervision of the National Guard; in time, about one-third of the insurgent force was recruited. This program had several desirable effects--it improved the transportation system, helped to reduce unemployment, and provided a means both for giving work to rural inhabitants, who might have turned to banditry, and for bringing insurgent elements into the system. Unfortunately, because the Nicaraguan Congress refused to allocate additional money, the program was abandoned after 11.2 miles of road had been completed.¹³⁰

Other civic action measures were attempted. Navy Corpsmen supplied medical assistance to the poor and worked to control malaria and eradicate mosquitos; a well-developed medical department and a training school for hospital corpsmen were established and a number of general hospitals and infirmaries were constructed; however, the practice of granting free aid and medicine was discontinued because of lack of funds. Efforts were also made to improve the general educational system, but these were severely weakened by the government's inability to provide additional money--in 1931 all public schools were closed when the educational budget was reduced by 80 percent.

¹³⁰ Neil Macaulay, The Sandino Affair (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967), p. 153; Smith, op. cit., p. 100; Cummins, op. cit., p. 82.

Population and Resources Control

Measures which would now be included as parts of a population and resources control program were almost totally absent. The few measures taken were effective in some areas, but in the rural areas, particularly those of the North, efforts to control population movement were never very effective.

The most significant measure attempted by the Marine and Guard forces was a one-province program designed to resettle the rural inhabitants of pro-insurgent areas into areas protected by Marine and National Guard garrisons.¹³¹ In May 1930, the resettlement program was extended to other parts of the northern and central areas. After June 1, 1930, any person apprehended in the restricted zones was to be treated as a bandit. This program was a total failure; it created vast numbers of refugees who were poorly housed and fed and who blamed their poor condition on the U. S. and Nicaraguan Governments. Consequently, the program was soon abandoned; its primary result was a deepened resentment toward the U. S. and Nicaraguan Governments--and the Marine and Guard administrators of the program. These resettlement efforts aided Sandino's forces and assisted his propaganda efforts.

Intelligence From the Population

The Guard attempted to gather two types of intelligence: (1) information on the strength, dispositions and movements of the bandits; (2) political intelligence.¹³² The first type was gathered in the field by Guard units, whose sources included the populace, hired agents, prisoners

¹³¹ Macaulay, op. cit., p. 164.

¹³² Smith, op. cit., p. 40.

and deserters, and was transmitted to the Guard's headquarters. The second type was obtained primarily from the civil populace. But the Guard was apparently unable to build a comprehensive intelligence system in rural areas because of the lack of popular support for the Nicaraguan Government and its programs. Even where good information was obtained, it was evaluated poorly and disseminated slowly. The lack of adequate communications between Guard posts also hindered the transmittal of tactical intelligence.

As one authority has indicated, a most important indicator of progress in counterinsurgency efforts is the way in which the counter-insurgent does, or must, gather his intelligence. This is well supported by operational experience. Bjelajac sums it up:

If the bulk of government intelligence is acquired as a result of volunteered support from the civilian populace, this indicates strong support for the government and a lack of support for the insurgents. Conversely, if the bulk of government intelligence is gathered from military activities such as patrols, aerial reconnaissance, etc., the government programs are making little progress in winning popular support. . . .¹³³

The lack of an effective intelligence system was a notable weakness in the operations of the Guard. This weakness was indicated by the frequency with which Guard units were ambushed,¹³⁴ their almost complete reliance on purely military means of intelligence collection, such as patrols and aerial reconnaissance, and the lack of voluntary intelligence given by the populace in rural areas. The insurgents, on the

¹³³Slavko N. Bjelajac, Guidelines for Measuring Success in Counterinsurgency (McLean, Va.: Research Analysis Corporation, n.d.), p. 12.

¹³⁴Frazier, op. cit., p. 494.

other hand, had an excellent intelligence network that included informers and agents in practically all villages in contested areas. However, as the Guard became more aggressive and was able to provide more effective security in the rural areas, voluntary intelligence did improve.

Operations and Problems

The Guard encountered constant problems in gaining the cooperation of Nicaraguan civil officials, administrators, and judicial authorities. The Government in Managua constantly interfered with its nonpartisan basis and attempted to extend political control over it.¹³⁵ Local officials also attempted to place the Guard in the same sort of subordinate political role that the Nicaraguan National Army had played before its disbandment.¹³⁶ The efforts to undermine the nonpartisan character of the Guard were successfully resisted as long as the officers were U. S. Marines, but this changed drastically as Nicaraguan officers were commissioned beginning in 1930.¹³⁷

Psychological Operations

Aside from frequent offers of amnesty and the occasional dropping of psychological warfare leaflets, the only significant instances of what are now called psyop were a number of more or less unplanned "communications by acts." These included the provision of free medical care and drugs, attempts to improve sanitary conditions and eradicate malaria, the assistance given by the Guard during the Managua earthquake

¹³⁵Macaulay, op. cit., p. 165.

¹³⁶Smith, op. cit., p. 53.

¹³⁷Macaulay, op. cit., p. 175.

of March 1931 and the general respect shown for the civil rights and property of the citizenry--all can be considered positive psyop by deeds. Unfortunately, any favorable impacts that resulted were more than offset when members of the Guard mistreated civilians, committed atrocities, and carried out the poorly organized resettlement effort. These actions, easily propagandized by insurgents, exacerbated a situation made difficult by the Americans' demonstrated misunderstanding of Nicaraguan values, customs, sensitivities, and aspirations--a circumstance that obviously weakened the overall effort to restore stability to Nicaragua.

Outcome

The Guard was not able to provide an effective counterbalance to the insurgent forces until 1932; its efforts suffered by the absence of concerted programs for improvement in the economic and educational sectors, and by the lack of emphasis given to the interface with the civilian populace. However, in the absence of very sophisticated opposition by modern standards, the Guard did contribute to the following achievements:

1. Pacified four departments (provinces), and parts of four others.
2. Helped supervise the elections of 1928, 1930, 1932.
3. Secured the major railroad
4. Kept the major mines secure and operable.
5. Forced the insurgents to limit their operations to the thinly settled areas of the north. (The Guard did not, however, succeed in suppressing banditry until 1933, and it was never able to capture Sandino.)

6. Maintained a legally elected President in office for four years.

7. Compelled peace terms.¹³⁸

By the time of the withdrawal of U. S. forces in 1933, the Guard was a well-organized military force numbering 2,650; it had a medical department, a legal department, a military academy, and an adequate countrywide communications system.¹³⁹ In terms of its military missions, the Guard was by then reasonably successful.

But when viewed in the larger perspective of the overall mission--to restore stability to Nicaragua--the Guard did not leave a stable condition. Internecine conflict continued. The economic condition of the country was not substantially improved. Most important, although the Guard was originally conceived to be a nonpartisan military and police force, the military power of the Guard was used as a means of perpetuating the power of a dictatorship. The nonpartisan concept underlying the constabulary policy reflected from the beginning a fundamental misunderstanding of the socio-economic and political conditions in Nicaragua.¹⁴⁰ This became apparent when the American Marine commanders were removed from the Guard: it quickly became a totally partisan body--essentially a politico-military extension of the Somoza administration--used to expand and then maintain the political and military power of its commander.

¹³⁸Smith, op. cit., p. 142

¹³⁹Metcalf, op. cit., p. 461.

¹⁴⁰Marvin Goldwert, The Constabulary in the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua (Gainesville, Florida: University of Florida Press, 1962), p. vi.

Conclusions

As Bernard Nalty indicates, the Nicaraguan constabulary effort was marked by "the absence of those techniques which recently have come to be associated with such operations."¹⁴¹ Perhaps the most striking aspect of the entire joint U. S. -Nicaraguan effort to combat the insurgency, and to restore some semblance of economic and political stability to the country, was the absence of a planned, coordinated program of counterinsurgency measures. In retrospect, it is likely that a coordinated training program, combining language training and familiarization with Nicaraguan culture, combined with indoctrination for Guard personnel in community relations, would have reduced frictions between the U. S. and Nicaraguan elements of the Guard, and between the Guard and the population as a whole.

Because the conflict was viewed from a conventional warfare perspective, the complex aspects of what was essentially a revolutionary guerrilla warfare situation were poorly understood and were not given the detailed attention they warranted in the formulation of plans and programs. In the final analysis the Marine Guard officer could

...draw a little strength from military institutions; the effectiveness of his leadership depended upon the force of his own personality. The successful Guard officer had the qualities of fearlessness, common sense, a knowledge of human nature, an enduring patience and good humor, and a working fluency in the Spanish tongue.¹⁴²

¹⁴¹ Bernard C. Nalty, "Nicaragua (1927-1933)" in D. M. Condit and Bert H. Cooper, Jr., et al. (eds.), Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict, Volume III: The Experience in Africa and Latin America (Washington, D. C.: Center for Research in Social Systems, 1968), p. 164.

¹⁴² Macaulay, op. cit., p. 174.

Marine Combined Action in Viet-Nam

The Viet-Nam conflict is often discussed as if it consisted of two separate wars: the quasi-conventional "big battalion" engagements between Allied and North Vietnamese regular forces, and the "other war" --the village-level counter guerrilla, pacification and revolutionary development operations¹⁴³ conducted by small paramilitary and "unconventional" forces. The Marine Combined Action Program (CAP) clearly falls into the latter category and was selected for study as a vital current example of the employment of military forces in a role similar to that played by the constabulary in the preceding cases.

This case study is based primarily on field observations in I Corps of South Vietnam conducted by A. T. Rambo in September 1968, supplemented with materials from Marine Corps documents and interviews with former CAP personnel.¹⁴⁴ The format is similar to that used in the historical cases described earlier.

¹⁴³B. Gen. L. J. Dulacki (USMC) says that, "We are fighting a war with three interlocking campaigns --the big unit campaign, the counter guerrilla campaign, and the revolutionary development campaign designed to strengthen and protect the basic fabric of society." Speech to Federation of War Veterans' Societies, Pittsburg, Penna., 11 Nov. 1967.

¹⁴⁴The field study of the Combined Action Programs covered the period 6 through 26 September 1968. The author, a social anthropologist with nine months' experience in Viet-Nam, visited seven Combined Action Platoons (CAPs) in two Combined Action Groups (CAGs) (the 2nd and 3rd CAGs) for periods ranging from five days to half a day. At least one night was spent at each of five of these CAPs.

Data were collected primarily by participant-observation. To the fullest extent possible for a civilian, the writer lived the life of the CAP Marines, taking part in a sweeping operation and a night ambush patrol. The obvious limitations on the validity and coverage of these observations are the small sample of CAPs and the short time spent at each CAP.

Interviewing of squad members was the secondary method of data collection. This was done informally in the course of normal

Organization*

The Combined Action Program, an integral part of Marine Corps operations in I Corps of Viet-Nam, is organized in four echelons. The Director, Combined Action Program, is on the Special Staff, III MAF, and serves to monitor and coordinate the entire program. The four Combined Actions Groups (CAG) are the sector-level organizations which are responsible for supervision of training, administration, supply and administrative and logistical support to subordinate district or sub-sector level Combined Action Companies (CACO). Combined Action Companies are small, nontactical headquarters responsible for the administration, logistic support, and coordination of between 3 and 10 platoons. Combined Action Platoons (CAPLT) are assigned to particular villages and consist of one USMC rifle squad, augmented by one Navy Corpsman, working in coordination with one Vietnamese Popular Force (PF) platoon. Overall operational control of the Combined Action Platoon is exercised jointly by the Combined Action Company commander and the Vietnamese Subsector commander through bilateral agreement. At such times as conditions warrant, tactical control of Combined Action Platoon operations may be delegated to infantry battalions or other designated

(Footnote 144, continued)

conversations, with the researcher writing up his notes in private afterwards. Simultaneously, two Vietnamese interpreters, who have worked with the writer over a three-year period, were conducting informal interviews with the Popular Forces soldiers and with the villagers to ascertain their attitudes toward the Combined Action Program. The author wishes to acknowledge the excellent cooperation of many personnel in the Combined Action Program, particularly Lt. Col. B. F. Brady, CAP Director, Lt. Col. R. D. Jones, C. O. 2nd CAG, Lt. Col. Whitesell, C. O. 3rd CAG, Maj. J. F. Baxter, S-3, 3rd CAG, and MSgt. R. S. Level of the DAP Director's staff.

*Description of Combined Action Program by III MAF, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, 1968.

units in order to insure unity of command within the Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR). At the Platoon level, the village chief and the Popular Forces leader are formally in charge of the combined unit but the Marine NCO retains direct command of his squad and also serves as advisor to the PF leader. Formal lines of command are often superseded by informal relationships, however, and Marines will be found directly commanding Vietnamese and vice versa depending on experience and personality.

Origin*

While the constabulary concept is not original to Vietnam, Marines there independently started operations now referred to as combined action as a response to local needs. When Marines landed over Red Beach in Da Nang on 8 March 1965 and subsequently established enclaves at Phu Bai and Chu Lai, commanders were immediately impressed with the complexities of the situation. Though the initial objectives of the landing were accomplished successfully, confrontations with main-force VC units did not develop, and Marines suffered attrition from booby traps, mines, snipers, and other types of VC action at the local, hamlet level. Hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese lived within 81mm mortar range of the Marine bases. Thus, security requirements made local pacification an immediate priority. And, as Marines began expanding the TAOR from these three enclaves, internal security would necessarily weaken. "As relatively secure areas kept growing, we needed more and more troops, naturally, to keep the areas secure. So we hit on the idea for a security

* This section is drawn largely from an excellent overview of the subject given by Col. D. H. Blanchard in this thesis Pacification: Marine Corps Style, NWC, 15 May 1968. An official version is in Marine Combined Action Program, Vietnam, Annex A, FMFPAC, 1967.

force of a few Marines and about twice as many villagers. We called these security elements Combined Action units.¹⁴⁵ From this ad hoc effort in July 1965, the Combined Action Program was to grow to seven platoons in January 1966, 57 in January 1967, and over 100 platoons deployed throughout I Corps in late 1968.

Missions

The CAPs have essentially the same mission as those stated for the Popular Forces:¹⁴⁶

- Destroy the VC infrastructure within the village or hamlet area of responsibility.
- Protect public security and help maintain law and order.
- Protect the friendly infrastructure.
- Protect bases and communication axes within the villages and hamlets.
- Organize people's intelligence nets.
- Participate in civic action and conduct propaganda against the VC.

The Marine component, however, has the additional task of increasing the level of training and self-confidence of the Vietnamese militiamen.

These multiple CAP missions are directed toward achieving more-or-less concurrently three separate objectives:

1. Area Security--the denial to Viet Cong military units of free access to the human and material resources in a village.

¹⁴⁵Major General Lewis W. Walt, "Address at 13th Annual Reunion IIIrd Marine Division Association," Cherry Hill, N.J.: 22 July 1967.

¹⁴⁶FMFPAC, op. cit., p. 4.

2. Pacification--protection of pro-government elements from Viet Cong terrorism and the identification and elimination of local insurgent organizations and cadres.
3. Institution Building--the development of indigenous Vietnamese capabilities for continuing self-defense and self-government after American withdrawal.

Effectiveness

Given their multiple missions, the lack of suitable performance criteria and the widely varying environments in which the CAPs operate, it is difficult to make any overall assessment of their effectiveness. It appears, however, that the program has been most successful in achieving its objective of providing area security, somewhat successful in developing local defensive capability and least successful in the area of pacification.

Area Security

Security is a word with multiple meanings. In this paper, however, it is used only with reference to the tactical military situation and people's perception of it. If a CAP has prevented occupation of its village by enemy main force units then the village is secure (although the villagers may not perceive this and are still subjectively insecure). It appears that the CAPs have been far more successful in developing objective security than they have in changing the villagers' perceptions.

Objective success in performing the security mission is indicated by the fact that "the Viet Cong have never been able to re-establish control over a village occupied by a CAP platoon." ¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁷ FMFPAC, op. cit., p. III.

During the TET offensive when some CAPs around Da Nang were hit hard by the NVA main forces, they held out in all cases and are believed by some officials* to have been responsible, by slowing the enemy thrust, for saving Da Nang from the fate of Hue. Even on those few occasions (such as west of Hoi An in mid-1968) where VC units have succeeded in over-running a CAP compound, a new team has been in place within 24 hours.

Vietnamese living in CAP villages do not necessarily feel more secure however, and some reported that a CAP in their village decreases security by making it a target for Viet Cong attacks. Of course, if a CAP is attacked by a large force it must concentrate on defending its compound, not the hamlet as a whole, and the villagers are likely to find themselves caught in the middle. People had moved out of houses near one CAP compound for just this reason.

The presence of a CAP does definitely increase the villagers' sense of security, in one regard, by reducing the frequency of unfortunate incidents involving U.S. regular forces and Vietnamese civilians. While American troop behavior is generally good, incidents of individual soldiers mistreating civilians do occur. CAP Marines develop a protective sense toward "their" villagers and are quick to intervene if a line unit trooper starts to misbehave. Further, CAPs by providing liaison and communication between village officials and American units prevent many of the mistakes and operational accidents that occur so readily in a guerrilla warfare situation. Thus, on one occasion a regular company operating in a CAP village began "capturing" large numbers of armed civilians whom they assumed to be Viet Cong. The

*Blanchard thesis, op. cit., pp. 77-78.

CAP NCO was able to secure quickly the release of the village self-defense force members before any serious incident developed.

Pacification

The CAPs do not appear to have been particularly effective agents of pacification--the elimination of enemy infrastructure and protection of GVN officials and supporters. Thus, while the presence of a Combined Action Platoon tends to secure at least part of the village where it is assigned by denying free access to VC infiltration patrols, propagandists and recruiters, the CAP does not and cannot, given its size and means, provide complete protection to pro-government individuals from insurgent terrorist and assassination activities. At one of the best-run CAPs, of those observed, the VC had assassinated a pro-government villager residing only a few hundred feet from the compound two nights before the writer's visit. Such activity in the actual hamlet where the CAP resides is probably unusual, but it is more frequent in the marginal hamlets of the village, which are often less well protected by CAP patrols. Inability to provide the desired degree of security even to all hamlets of a village is evident in a CAP located south of Phu Bai, where after 3 years of continuous CAP operations a hamlet under 1,000 meters from the village headquarters is still considered to be VC controlled, and other hamlets are viewed as insecure.

The extent of CAP success in identification and elimination of the Viet Cong local infrastructure is difficult to assess. Marines interviewed did not appear to have been much aware of the existence or structure of the insurgent political apparatus, nor is instruction in this area stressed in CAP training. Rather their energies are concentrated on combatting the guerrilla forces. In this regard, since 1 January 1966,

the CAPs are reported to have accounted for 1,532 enemy KIA and 621 captured--the equivalent of 5 enemy battalions destroyed.¹⁴⁸ This is indeed an enviable record, a strong inducement for popular support. Nonetheless, the mission cannot be said to have been completed until the VC infrastructure is eliminated.

Institution Building

It is probably too soon to evaluate the lasting effect CAPs will have on local forms of government and Popular Forces. Only a few former CAP hamlets have been turned back to Vietnamese control and these are all in highly secure situations where the militia have not been put to the test since the U.S. withdrawal. Two former CAP villages were observed and at each the PF had allowed the defenses of their compounds to deteriorate badly from their former condition. They had also ceased running night ambush patrols, but stated that this was because without the Marines there they had no way of coordinating their operations with neighboring U.S. regular units.

Only one CAP was observed to have a systematic training program for the PF, but most of the militia in the platoons visited were already well-trained in basic military skills and in some cases appeared equal in tactical knowledge to the Marines.

An indication that CAP is successful in developing esprit in the PF is provided by the fact that while Popular Forces had during 1967 a country-wide desertion rate of more than 11 percent there were no recorded desertions by PFs from CAP units.¹⁴⁹ It is also noteworthy that PFs eagerly seek to obtain the CAP badge.

¹⁴⁸ FMFPAC, op. cit., p. 15.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

Factors Affecting CAP Effectiveness

Factors that appear to be related to the differential success with which the CAPs have achieved their objectives are as follows:

- 1) strategic concepts of deployment;
- 2) personnel characteristics;
- 3) training of CAP personnel;
- 4) perception of mission;
- 5) tactics and techniques of counterinsurgency operations;
- 6) leadership and command supervision;
- 7) problems in combined operations;
- 8) civil-military relations;
- 9) language problems.

Strategic Concepts of Deployment

CAPs seem to be deployed for a variety of local tactical reasons. From a map survey of CAP deployments, one can infer three or four somewhat different strategic concepts: protection of critical military installations (the air field at Da Nang), and serving as outposts for major urban centers (the "rocket belt" CAPs around Da Nang); keeping critical arteries of transport clear (notably, Route 1); and extending the pacified area or oilspot (the CAPs along the Thu Bon river south of Da Nang). While each concept has much in its favor, the different concepts imply different priorities of CAP missions, hence detracting from coordinated effort among CAPs and between CAPs and local forces in villages where CAPs are not present. While they often perform their strategic tasks successfully, the pacification mission tends to suffer because the CAPs are too widely scattered to provide interlinking coverage of a wide area, thus leaving interstices where Viet Cong control is rarely contested.

Even at the level of the individual village it is difficult if not impossible for a unit the size of a CAP to provide 24-hour security to all of the hamlets.

CAP Personnel Characteristics

Demographic Characteristics. CAP Marines in the three squads surveyed had an average age of 20, with the youngest 18 and the oldest 24 years. Mean educational level was 11 years of school, with 8 years the least and 13 years the maximum. Mean time in the Marine Corps was 22 months; mean time in Viet-Nam was 11 months with a range of 3-1/2 months to 21 months. Marines averaged 5-1/2 months service in the Combined Action Program. Six percent were Sergeants (E-5), 24 percent Corporals, 42 percent Lance Corporals, and 27 percent PFC's or Privates. 83 percent had an 0311 (rifleman) MOS.

On the basis of the above data it can be seen that Marine personnel assigned to CAP are in no sense an elite group such as Army Special Forces aspires to. On the contrary CAPs must operate in an extremely demanding environment with young men of average qualifications and minimal formal training for a number of the difficult jobs that confront them.

No data are available to us on the demographic characteristics of the Popular Forces assigned to CAP, but platoons appear to vary greatly in the quality of their personnel. Many are led by veterans of ARVN who have considerable combat experience. Technical training is uniformly weak, however, and consequently maintenance of equipment and services is generally poor.

Selection of Personnel for CAP Program. Marines come to the Combined Action Program after service in line units. In theory all are volunteers highly recommended by their commanding officers*, although in the past some units have filled their CAP quotas with their least desirable personnel. Three men of one squad said that they had been volunteered into CAP by their COs. This practice has been strongly protested by the CAGs and the CG III MAF has issued corrective directives.

Volunteers are interviewed by CAG officers before admission to the school and obvious misfits selected out. Once a man has been accepted into the program, however, it is difficult to remove him no matter how unsatisfactory his performance, as FMFPAC requires disciplinary reasons as justification for a transfer. Dislike of, or inability to work with, the Vietnamese is not considered grounds for transferral.

Corpsmen are assigned directly to the program from CONUS and are not volunteers. Most appear to be satisfied with their assignment, however.

PFs are assigned as a unit by the District Chief to a Combined Action Platoon. In theory, men are recruited from the village they are to defend, but this is only rarely the case in practice, especially in strongly contested areas where there is a manpower deficit.

Morale and Attitude Toward Service in CAP. Morale appears uniformly high. Few Marines would be in Viet-Nam by personal choice, but with rare exceptions they would rather spend their tour in CAP than in the line units. Although some view CAP as a softer and less hazardous duty, many appear to welcome the opportunity to engage in constructive actions on behalf of the Vietnamese and to work with greater personal autonomy and initiative than is possible in line units.

* Civic Action, MCI 03.30, 8 January 1968

The NCOs especially appear to like the opportunity to have their own command with considerably more responsibility than is demanded of a rifle squad leader.

The PFs appear to be generally ambiguous toward combined action. They appreciate some of the benefits of the Marine presence such as improved fire support, rapid medical evacuation (which is provided for wounded PF and civilians as readily as it is for Marines), more reliable supply and increased firepower due to the Marine M16s. On the other hand, the PF resent the competition for village girls, the bullying attitude of some Marines, and feel that if they had good weapons and reliable support from ARVN they would not need Marines to help them.

Training of CAP Personnel

CAP Marines attend a two-week predeployment school where they are given limited language training, instruction as to their mission and indoctrination in proper behavior toward their counterparts and the civilian population. Little specialized training in counterinsurgency tactics and techniques is given, however, and knowledge of intelligence collection and analysis, civic action and psychological operations is poorly developed.¹⁵⁰ Selected individuals are sent to the one-month Vietnamese language course run by III MAF. The one-month course is not sufficient to develop speaking proficiency and few individuals in the observed platoons could carry on even a simple conversation in

¹⁵⁰ Analysis of the CAP School Training Schedule 24-68 for 7-19 November 1968 reveals that 74 percent (55 hours) of actual instructional time of 74 hours was devoted to tactical subjects (weapons, map reading, patrol techniques, etc.), 19 percent (14 hours) to special CAP areas of interest (PF training, psyops, civic action, counterintelligence, etc.) and 7 percent (5 hours) to instruction in the Vietnamese language.

Vietnamese. Corpsmen have been through a special counterinsurgency course in CONUS.

The PF on enlisting attend a 6-week basic military course at the provincial militia training center and are sent back for periodic refresher training on an irregular basis. Selected men are sent to interpreters' school, but the course is so short that no real fluency in English is developed.

Perception of Missions

CAP leaders vary in their understanding of what their missions and objectives are. Some emphasize training of the PF while others, perhaps the majority, are principally concerned with seeking and destroying Viet Cong guerrilla forces, with success measured in terms of number of contacts and kills.*

Tactics and Techniques of Counterinsurgency Operations

While there is variation from platoon-to-platoon, most CAPs appear proficient in small unit military tactics, especially night patrolling and ambushing. Noise and camouflage discipline are generally well-observed and patrol routes and ambush sites are carefully selected. It is in the less conventional but equally important aspects of counterinsurgency--civic action, psychological operations, population and resources control, and civil intelligence collection and analysis, etc.--that the CAPs tend to perform at far less than the optimum level.

Civic Action. Although civic action concepts are taught in the CAP school few Marines in the platoons appear to have much understanding of either the methods or objectives of a civic action program.

* See also A Marine Counterinsurgency Support System, Matrix, 1 October 1968.

Some CAPs are conducting no civic action other than medcaps; in others, effort is mechanical with little or no attention being paid to the needs or desires of the Vietnamese. In only one CAP visited was the program being conducted in direct concert with village officials.

Psychological Operations. No formal psychological influence program was observed either on the part of the Marines or the PF (who in theory are supposed to engage in "psychological action" to influence the civilian population). The Marines, by their behavior, have a profound impact on the surrounding population, of course, and while good relations with civilians are strived for, such efforts need to be further capitalized on by carefully conducted psyops.*

Population and Resources Control. Reliable statistics are unavailable to us, but one observer claims that CAP population control efforts have drastically reduced the flow of recruits from the villages to the Viet Cong main force units.¹⁵¹ CAPs observed varied. One had a formal program including an index card on each household; others were less organized, but appear to know informally who belongs where in the village. Several village officials and PF leaders stated that they do not like for Marines to check ID cards, as the language difficulty often leads to mistakes.

Weapons recovery is generally stressed. Rewards are paid to civilians who turn in arms and ammunition. Several CAP leaders said that the program is quite successful. Children especially, eagerly collected ammunition abandoned by regular units during operations.

* James M. Dodson, William W. Chenault, M. Dean Havron. The Role of Psychological Operations in Naval Missions: An Appraisal and Recommendations (McLean, Va.: Human Sciences Research, Inc., June 1968) Limited Distribution.

¹⁵¹ Corson, op. cit., pp. 184-85.

Civil Intelligence. While CAPs frequently receive advance warning of attacks on their villages, they do not appear to be as successful in collecting information on the Viet Cong infrastructure and its activities. In part this is due to a lack of background information on what to look for; in part it reflects the language gap which hinders communication even with cooperative sources.

Defection Program. CAPs participate in the national Chieu Hoi campaign to attract Viet Cong to rally to the GVN, but no information is available to us on the specific effect of CAPs on this program.

Leadership and Command Supervision

The quality of the Marine squad leader appears to be the single most important variable effecting the performance of individual CAPs. Where the NCO is able, aggressive and understands his mission, the CAP generally performs well; where the leader has gone slack, the platoon is slack as well. Unfortunately, there is currently an acute shortage of experienced noncommissioned officers, not just in the Combined Action Program, but in the Marine Corps as a whole. To meet the requirements of the war, young and relatively inexperienced men are serving as sergeants. This presents serious enough problems in the line companies where NCO's operate under direct officer supervision, but the requirement is much greater in the CAPs, where the squad leaders operate virtually autonomously and without day-to-day supervision from higher levels.¹⁵²

¹⁵²The CACO is theoretically responsible for supervising the platoons. However, the CACO must devote almost all its effort to providing operational support to its CAP's and lacks sufficient personnel to continually monitor the activities of the platoons. Thus, CAP Marines are left to their own devices and, at all platoons visited, reported that they had never had an officer spend the night with them or accompany them on patrol.

Problems in Combined Vietnamese-American Operations

As is to be expected in any multi-national force, personal relations between Vietnamese and Americans have not always been perfect nor coordination of Marine and PF activities smooth or efficient. Few platoons have achieved the complete integration which has been one of the implicit goals of the program. In fact, none of the CAPs observed was a true combined force. Rather, the Marine squad and the Popular Force platoon remained two independent forces which, to some extent, coordinated their planning and on occasion engaged in joint operations. Three factors contribute to maintaining the distinctness of the units:

- a. Communications Problems. In only one CAP was there a Marine sufficiently fluent in Vietnamese to freely converse with his counterparts. In general, Marines stay with Marines and Popular Forces with Popular Forces, and there is little social interaction between the nationalities.
- b. Different Tactical Concepts. The Popular Forces see their task as securing the village by whatever strategy is required while the Marines are primarily interested in killing Viet Cong. Thus each force seeks to run different types of operations.
- c. Different Organizational Concepts. The Marines are professional military, the Popular Forces are part-time militia. PFs are not suitable as a force for engaging in the type of continuous activity that many CAPs want to pursue.

Marines often deprecate the Popular Forces for lack of aggressiveness. This view grows in part from Marine failure to understand that the Popular Forces are militia not soldiers. To the extent that it is objectively true it results from:

- a. Low Popular Force firepower. The PFs are still armed with M1 rifles and M2 carbines and they report a severe shortage of carbine ammunition and M26 grenades. In some cases, the PFs are obtaining M16's from illegal sources because the CAP Marines will supply them with adequate ammunition for this weapon. The PFs frequently state that if they were given M16's and sufficient ammunition they would not need Marines to help them fight.
- b. The Vietnamese say that the Marines do not realize that PFs suffer fatigue more rapidly than Americans in operational situations.
- c. The PFs view the war as a long-term affair, not a 13-month tour. They are much less interested in winning medals or promotion than in surviving.

On the other hand, some Popular Forces members have a low regard for Marine tactical knowhow. They say that the Marines are not very proficient at patrolling and ambushing.

Popular Force leaders for their part are sometimes conscious of age and status differences between themselves and the CAP NCOs. Assignment of corporals as CAP leaders is not always well received by Popular Forces leaders and reduces their readiness to accept Marine advice.

Marines are sometimes hostile toward Popular Forces whom they accuse of stealing. This is often true, but Marines worsen the problem by being careless with their possessions. Also, the village children are often responsible for thefts, but the Marines blame the Popular Forces. Rations are the main item "stolen" by the PF, but in many cases they feel they are merely taking what is their due. Out of such minor incidents and misunderstandings between the Marines and the PF can grow major conflicts when the two groups cannot readily

communicate, as is more often the case than not. The main barrier to improvement of relations is the language problem. The Popular Forces want to become friends with the Marines but find it very difficult because they cannot communicate readily.

Civil Military Relations

Considering the situation, there is remarkably little overt friction caused by the presence of 14 foreigners in a rural Vietnamese hamlet. Face-to-face relations appear generally friendly, although due to lack of a common language most interchanges between Marines and civilians are limited to a few words of greeting, smiles and playing with the little children who invariably tag along if CAP Marines walk through their village. CAPs observed varied widely in the extent to which they had become integrated in village life and had established affective ties with Vietnamese. In some, Marines spent virtually all of their free time in the village, ate with the people frequently and reported that they virtually always received a tip-off of impending Viet Cong attacks on their compounds. In other units they kept to themselves much more and were dependent on the PF for relaying all intelligence.

Language and Communication

Preceding sections have made repeated references to lack of Vietnamese language capability as a source of problems in CAP operations. This deficiency, which makes communication with both the PF and the civilian population difficult, appears to be at the root of many other problems which are not usually thought of as problems of communication. For example, many Vietnamese civilians reported that they wanted to give intelligence to CAPs, but could not do so because no CAP Marine understood Vietnamese and no readily accessible Vietnamese civilian

spoke English. Many Popular Forces personnel stated that they wanted to become friends with the Marines but find it difficult because they cannot communicate readily. Minor incidents of apparent pilferage can escalate into mutual distrust between Vietnamese and Americans--distrust which cannot be readily reduced when the two peoples cannot communicate. One such case was observed during a visit to one CAP, and was quickly settled to the satisfaction of all, thanks to bilingual Vietnamese interviewers.

In the broadest sense, communications occur by word and act. Acts will communicate much; in the absence of a bilingual person on either side, they will necessarily communicate much more than words. A strong feeling of understanding and sympathy on the part of Marines is readily noted by the villagers and is important. Maintaining good relations provides the basis for rapport, but without the ability to converse freely, many of the potential benefits of such relations are lost.

Given the difficulty of learning Vietnamese, few Marines have spontaneously developed any real language proficiency. Nor, in view of the lack of incentives to learn--proficiency pay, listing in the Marine's personal file, provision of self-teaching language materials--is it surprising that only one Marine in all of the CAP squads observed spoke Vietnamese with any real fluency.

CAPs -- A Preliminary Appraisal

Since the Combined Action Program is an on going effort, constantly undergoing change, no final appraisal can be made now. But the needs both for immediate guidance and for development of a proven U.S. pacification capability make it desirable to start establishing frames of reference within which a thorough evaluation can be made. An adequate appraisal must take into account the soundness and value of the concept as inferred from a theory of counterinsurgency operations, and projections of capabilities that future situations will require of U.S. military forces. Such an appraisal will also analyze closely present Marine experience to determine the feasibility of implementing the concept, and training and supervision required to implement it well.

Our too-limited observations of present Marine experience suggest most substantial differences among individual CAPs in the effectiveness with which the concept is being implemented. But viewing CAPs in the broad perspective of present and future U.S. needs, it seems clear that

- a) The concept is sound--a mandatory requirement for successful counterinsurgency operations.
- b) The concept is feasible; it can be implemented.
- c) A number of measures remain to be taken by cognizant Marine executives if the concept is to be effectively implemented among the scores of individual CAPs that dot the I Corps area.

The CAP Concept

The Combined Action concept is mandatory, and has been demonstrated to be basically sound. As Brig. Gen. Dulacki (USMC) has stated, "... we can achieve victories in large-scale battles for 20 years, but if we do not make progress in pacification, we will not be making headway towards victory in the total war."* In a war that is part conventional and part pacification, main forces and onstabulary elements are complementary and mutually reinforcing. While conventional battles are often intense, they tend to be short-lived, with the enemy committing no more than a fraction of his forces. Defeated, he retreats, regroupes, and rebuilds. And, as long as he can continue to draw on civilians for recruits, supplies, and intelligence, he can accept severe losses in occasional battalion-size battles. Thus, the less dramatic contest to control human and material resources becomes as crucial as the conventional effort. Obviously, CAPs could rapidly be chewed up piecemeal by VC/NVA battalions if friendly main force units were not present; but it is equally obvious that main force units cannot expect to completely defeat an enemy who refuses to engage in a climactic series of battles, and who has access to people and supplies to replace his losses. Pacification is mandatory in a phase III counterinsurgency operation, and the CAP concept is a sound method for achieving its objectives.

Practicality of the Concept

The CAP concept can be implemented. CAP platoons have survived in the face of intense hostile pressure and brought a certain measure of security** and increased government presence to hundreds of thousands of villagers. Most squads have succeeded in their mission of providing

* Brig. Gen. L. Dulacki (USMC), Speech to the Federation of War Veterans' Societies of Alleghany County, Pittsburgh, Pa., 11 Nov. 1967.

** Blanchard thesis, op. cit., p. 86.

area security, sometimes to as many as 6,000 people--a ratio of one Marine to 400 Vietnamese civilians. Some outstanding CAPs have demonstrated proven capability in civil affairs missions. For example, certain CAPs have induced VCs to rally by working through their families, controlled the storage and distribution of rice in the village (thus denying this vital supply to the enemy), and reduced sick calls by two-thirds by teaching village sanitation practices. Some CAPs have gained sufficient esteem and confidence in their communities that villagers voluntarily warn them well in advance of impending VC attacks, raids, and political rallies.* While many CAPs have not accomplished such things, these successes show that the CAP concept can be effectively implemented. CAPs provide the framework for developing a capability not now evidenced by other services, a capability of the greatest importance in counterinsurgency operations. And it is a capability that can be achieved.

Deficiencies Requiring Correction

To the extent that our limited observations in September 1968 are typical, CAP effectiveness can be quite substantially heightened, thereby increasing the effectiveness of the Marine Corps effort in I Corps. Given the perspective provided by the prior four cases and the next section, a number of deficiencies are obvious. A few outstanding CAP leaders have largely overcome them; others have not. Many of these deficiencies are not fundamentally difficult to correct; most require little additional input of personnel.¹⁵³ What is required most of all is a broad orienta-

* Blanchard thesis, op. cit.

¹⁵³ A number of recommendations were made in the interim report of Human Sciences Research, Inc., Combined Action Platoons in Vietnam Interim Report, (McLean, Virginia: Human Sciences Research, Inc.), November 1968.

tion to the mission and the kind of insight and creative thinking so well demonstrated by Commissioner Taft in the Philippines, Captain Tilley (USN) in Samoa, Captain Puller (USMC) in Nicaragua, Sergeant Wirkus (USMC) in Haiti, and Sergeant Brown (USMC) in Vietnam. And this insight must start at CAG level; it must permeate CACOs and the CAP training program, and by these instrumentalities be conveyed to individual CAPs. Certain key deficiencies are noted below.

Increased attention should be given to approaches and actions that can capitalize on proven CAP military effectiveness and latent sympathy of the population to increase popular support. Logic as well as experience demonstrates the active role that civilians and local authorities must play if a constabulary--at most only a very small fraction of the local population--is to attain either its immediate objectives, such as rear-area security, or its longer-term objectives of creating conditions sufficiently stable to allow reduction in numbers and eventual withdrawal of the constabulary force. The absolute criticality of support from the populace has gone unrecognized in a number of the cases described in this report. In Vietnam the need is recognized. But in many cases, recognition has not been translated into methods and steps required to accomplish this task successfully against Viet Cong opposition.

Four major deficiencies were observed in CAP operations in September 1968.

Inadequate Training Program. The CAP training program (page 91) consisted of some 55 hours of tactical training and 19 hours of everything else: language, civic action, pacification, nation-building, etc. Granting that trained Marines do need further training in patrolling, ambushes, and similar duties as these need be adapted to the CAP mission, a few

"left-over" hours are not nearly adequate for such complex topics as pacification and nation-building. The curriculum reviewed suggests that neither area is adequately conceptualized; crucial topics get too little coverage. For example, few Marines interviewed knew about operations and tactics of insurgent undergrounds--the key instrumentality by which the Viet Cong maintain a local presence, even in many CAP-defended villages.

Inadequate Language Capabilities. In four of the five CAPs visited, no Marine could speak Vietnamese well enough to communicate adequately. (And no Vietnamese in these villages could speak much English.) This not only denies CAPs information that civilians could and would often like to provide, it leaves a fertile ground for aggravation of all the little frictions which can occur when two different cultural groups are thrown into intimate contact. Small misunderstandings become exaggerated and the impact on Marine-PF teamwork is damaging. Obviously, very little can be taught in five hours of language training; obviously, few CAP personnel can receive long formal training in Vietnamese. But if a CAP is to be truly effective, some Marine squad member must have conversational language proficiency.* Marines could learn on station via self-learning aids, daily sessions with Vietnamese friends; they could be encouraged to do so by inducements ranging from direct orders to pay bonuses, such as those used effectively in the Philippines.

* "A knowledge of the character of the people and a command of their language are great assets. Political methods and motives which govern the actions of foreign people and their political parties, incomprehensible at best to the average North American, are practically beyond the understanding of persons who do not speak their language. If not already familiar with the language, all officers upon assignment to expeditionary duty should study and acquire a working knowledge of it." (USMC Small Wars Manual, op. cit., Chapter I, Section III, p. 26).

It should be pointed out that language proficiency without understanding of and sensitivity to the local culture can prove detrimental. Widespread use of the Personal Response Handbooks* and other information becoming available on the Vietnamese culture should alleviate this problem.

Lack of Explicit Objectives. The objective of providing (physical) security is being actively pursued, but excepting the objectives some few CAPs defined for themselves, the CAPs seem to have virtually no explicit statements of objectives subdivided into feasible tasks oriented toward institution- and nation-building--toward the creation of a viable community willing and able to defend itself after Marines leave. What civic actions are carried out are frequently performed without full understanding of their broader objectives; without understanding, actions become mechanical and may prove ineffectual or even counterproductive.

Understaffing at Supervisory Levels. Because of understaffing, CACO personnel observed were able only to take supplies to the CAPs. Regarding pacification and nation-building activities, each CAP leader was left to define his own mission and objectives, and to decide what time would be spent in attempting to achieve them. Without adequate preparation or guidance, some few Marine sergeants managed to carry out effective overall programs, but such an operation cannot rely on the ability of a few inately gifted Marines who size up the opportunities and exploit them in the limited areas of their own operations and commands.

Due probably to personnel shortages, the CAG has not had opportunity (as of September 1968) to analyze these deficiencies and develop training methods and a supervisory apparatus to remedy them. The need

* NAVMC 2616, 1967

for closer analysis and supervision at CAG and CACO levels is perhaps the most critical requirement for a more effective approach to activities designed to generate and exploit popular support for CAPs and civilian authorities, thus denying the areas' resources to the enemy.

Remedial Steps Under Way. A number of steps have recently been taken to upgrade CAP operations, improve administration and content of the training program, and correct deficiencies of the type observed at some CAPs in September 1968. For example, a recent report* indicates that CAP volunteers are being carefully screened, time allocated to language training has been more than doubled, and a more extensive course is proposed, PF training is being standardized and upgraded, and CAPs are receiving closer and more meaningful supervision. Also, CAPs are being moved out of their compounds. This has several implications; a particularly favorable outcome should be improved communications between Marines and Vietnamese. While it is too early to evaluate the impact of these steps, they are consistent with HSR's recommendations. On a longer-term basis, the Office of Naval Research, in cooperation with the Marine Corps, has inaugurated a research program designed to help develop approaches, tactics and techniques to further increase CAP effectiveness. HSR researchers working in Vietnam will observe these recent measures in their follow-on appraisal of CAP effectiveness, and working with cognizant Marine Corps personnel, make further recommendations for increasing impact.

* Col. Edward F. Danowitz (USMC), Assistant Chief of Staff for CAPs III MAF, Tape which was recorded 12 January 1969.

PART THREE

SUMMARY ACROSS CASES

Table 1 summarizes cases across some sixteen parameters or sets of considerations (items A through P). Six parameters describe the mission, context and situational variables (A-F); ten evaluate U.S. policy and performance of U.S. and indigenous forces (G-P).

The summary of salient aspects of the five cases and of U.S. performance in Table 1 (pp. 110-114) make it possible to evaluate U.S. efforts by case, and in terms of each of the ten performance parameters across cases. Four scientists who made the case studies independently rated U.S. performance for each of the ten performance items for each case. A five-point scale was used, points on the scale being defined as follows:

- 1 U.S. actions taken were very frequently counter-productive.
- 0 U.S. forces took no actions of the sort described, or actions taken showed no real positive results.
- +1 Sufficient evidence is available to suggest that policy and actions provided minimally effective results.
- +2 Policies and actions definitely led to effective results but they were introduced late and/or not applied in some sections of the country.
- +3 Policies and actions were followed consistently by results definitely in keeping with the purpose of the mission. (Occasional exceptions are allowed.)

Averages of judges' ratings of constabulary performance are shown in Table 2 (page 115). Agreement among judges was high, which suggests that rating exhibits minimal validity.

Scores for individual cases are in accord with our overall impressions, except that we would have evaluated policy and operations in Haiti as less effective than those used in Nicaragua. In this case, the numerical ratings do bring out the fact that there were a great many civil affairs activities in Haiti, that during and after the Caco revolt an amnesty program was rather well conceived and executed, yielding good results, and that a working grievance system was established. But the fact remains that these inoculations didn't take. No substantial effort was made to provide the Haitian elite or some surrogate with the knowledge of political leadership and administration which Taft recognized as essential and worked hard to develop in the Philippines. As a police operation, Haiti was more efficient than Nicaragua, but the impact of such constructive, nation-building efforts as were undertaken was more than canceled by errors in policy and action.

Scores for CAPs in Vietnam fall roughly halfway between the Philippine and Samoan experiences, on the one hand, and Nicaragua and Haiti, on the other. Note again that our ratings are based on limited observations--only five CAPs of the 100 in the field. Nonetheless, we get an impression of variability among individual CAPs in their appreciation of the mission concept, in implementing the concept, and in overall effectiveness. Some individual CAPs are going an outstanding job. Their ratings on relevant items would approach the top of the scale. And for the many Marines in I Corps whose sense of mission, energy and enthusiasm are evident, it should be pointed out that they are confronted with a very tough opponent.

Summarizations across rows in Table 2 are not particularly informative with the exception of the tenth row, Evidence of Preparedness of Military Institutions on Entry to the Country. Ratings are essentially zero for all five cases as are their averages; this topic is discussed in greater detail in Part IV.

A problem not easily managed in the ratings is the effect of the intrinsic difficulty of the situation with which U.S. forces are confronted. Assuming ratings are valid to what extent do they reflect the difficulty of the situation U.S. forces encountered rather than actual performance? Clearly the Samoan operation was the easiest. Even so, the New Zealanders did not do well in Samoa. The most difficult, surely, is Vietnam, where we are not confronted basically with civil crime or with a group of poorly organized and trained dissidents but with a well organized, Communist-led movement that profits from meticulous collection, analysis and evaluation of data from Vietnam and prior insurgencies. The Philippines case, one of the most successful, was possibly the most difficult of the other three. In Haiti, where the whole operation was unsuccessful by most standards, there was the outstanding performance of Sergeant Faustin Wirkus, and in Vietnam, even in the face of strong opposition, some few Marine squads have shown the way.

While performance ratings do undoubtedly reflect in some measure the difficulty of the situation, performance is also affected by the extent to which American decision makers and in-country operators understand the situation and can develop the strategy and tactics required to deal with it. As evidenced in Haiti and elsewhere, American materiel resources can be helpful, or their existence can draw attention away from central problems. At best, they are but tools. What is required is an understanding of the mission in its cultural and social context, and an ability to define and evaluate action alternatives as they contribute to mission accomplishment in this context.

TABLE 1. SUMMARY: U.S. CONSTABULARY EXPERIENCE IN FIVE COUNTRIES¹

	PHILIPPINES 1898 - 1946	SAMOA 1900 - 1951	HAITI 1915 - 1934	NICARAGUA 1927-1933	CAPS VIETNAM 1965 - 19?
A. Background of Involvement	Treaty of Paris ceded Philippines to U.S.	Treaty--to aid Samoans survive as a culture; to set up a Naval base and coaling station.	U.S. protection of its political, financial interests; shield against European intervention.	Request of Nicaraguan President Diaz for U.S. entry and for constabulary.	CAPs were formed to provide better security around U.S. bases. Formalized in request of III MAF.
B. Concept on Entering	To govern newly acquired U.S. possession; to preserve peace.	To establish government to preserve people's rights; to provide security for coaling station for U.S. fleet.	To protect American legations and property; preserve order.	To restore peace and order.	To protect U.S. bases from sabotage, mortar attacks, secure vital roadways, help expand, consolidate expanding TAORS.
C. Occasion for Entry	Insurrection continued against U.S. occupation; need to eliminate political chaos and educate Filipinos in self-government.	A troublesome history; no organized central government; a need for peace.	Complete social, political, economic chaos; assassination of President.	Internal discord; revolutionary instability.	Recognition that neither Vietnamese militia nor Marine regular units were providing adequate area security.
D. Reaction of Natives on Entry	Accepted by majority; as constabulary became more skilled acceptance became excellent.	U.S. Naval administration was well-received.	Intervention unopposed until U.S. pressured Haitian acceptance of severe U.S. treaty. After that, reaction fearful, negative.	One rebel element caused great threat--would not disarm. Native judges openly hostile to U.S. intervention.	Indifferent to positive; villagers like medevac, CAP liaison with regular U.S. units.

¹ Entries for the first four cases refer to establishment and operation of a constabulary for the indigenous country.
 -- 0 Entries for Vietnam refer to establishment by Marines in I Corps of groups that came to be called CAPS.

E. Stated Purposes of Constabulary	<p>PHILIPPINES 1898 - 1946</p> <p>To preserve peace, keep order and enforce laws. To help maintain a stable government in the island territory.</p> <p>SAMOA 1900 - 1951</p> <p>To maintain law and order and end feuds among Samoan groups. Assist organization of U.S. administration of Samoa. Relieve Navy of having to provide its own security force.</p> <p>HAITI 1915 - 1934</p> <p>To stabilize traditional Haitian system, reshape army. To restore administration. To re-establish social stability favoring mulatto elite, restore economic stability.</p> <p>NICARAGUA 1927 - 1933</p> <p>Preserve peace, security of individual rights. Control arms, and ammunition. Control all government property used by forces of the republic. To train Nicaraguan officers to take over Guard positions.</p> <p>CAPS VIETNAM 1965 - 19?</p> <p>To provide area security, destroy enemy infrastructure and support the revolutionary development campaign.</p>
F. Major Obstacles Encountered	<p>Abuses, political machinations and poor discipline of police force and negative attitude of population toward it; desire for independence and resentment of extension of constabulary authority in civil matters.</p> <p>High chiefs were not always the best qualified to be officers in the Guard.</p> <p>High illiteracy and poor health of recruits; CACO banditry. Resentment of military and white intervention by citizens of the only Negro country that had successfully rebelled against white rule.</p> <p>Serious class divisions, lack of responsible local government, lack of educational system, high illiteracy, isolation of segments of population, little national identity, resentment toward U.S.</p> <p>Serious class divisions, PF motivation, equipment, tactics substandard. Vietnamese bureaucracy often poor. Inadequate knowledge of local customs. Inadequate arrangements of supervision of CAPs.</p>
G. Indoctrination / Training of U.S. Forces for Constabulary Duties	<p>Codes for constabulary recognized needs of Philippine population and training at first; this was improved. Incentive pay for language proficiency.</p> <p>(Not described in available sources. Our impression is the show was run by a Navy Captain with a very small staff which was evidently well indoctrinated.)</p> <p>No pre-commitment or in-country training; few had knowledge of Creole and French. No training in customs, etc.</p> <p>No systematic training in Spanish language, Nicaraguan values, attitudes, customs, sensibilities, etc.</p> <p>Two week training; of which 75% involves adaptations of conventional military tactics. Five hours language training--both inadequate.</p>

	PHILIPPINES 1898 - 1946	SAMOA 1900 - 1951	HAITI 1915 - 1934	NICARAGUA 1927 - 1933	CAPS VIETNAM 1965 - 19?
II. Relationships with Local Sources of Power	Criticality of good working relationships between Americans and Philipines stressed early. Implementation improved as American officers were better selected, trained.	Form of government allowed local decision-making. Close mutual relationships and respect developed; chiefs utilized as high ranking guardsmen and as local civil officials.	Distrust by Haitian officials of occupation and forced treaty. Few attempts by U.S. Forces to establish relations with former Haitian elite, these unsuccessful; U.S. often assumed government functions rather than training natives.	A muddled picture. A number of successful attempts to support local government balanced against many failures including antagonism from local judiciary	Parallel command; Marine Squad-PF; CACO-District; CAG-Province. Relationships generally good but often handicapped by language barrier.
I. Civil Affairs: * Civic action and public works--roads, education, agriculture, etc.	In most cases contacts between constabulary and local officials successful; some local leaders resented constabulary "interference." Used U.S. soldiers as teachers. Used troops in some public works projects.	Developed Samoan agriculture, set up agriculture schools; unified education system, raised level of schooling, increased Samoan interest in education.	U.S. officials often assumed role of local governments. Much road construction, irrigation projects, built many new schools. Seldom were these well integrated into culture; failed to erase overall negative image of U.S.	No comprehensive plan for civic action. Sponsored road building projects. Improved educational system, but poor finances weakened effort.	Varied. In most cases observed CAP civic action tended to be mechanical with little understanding of broader purposes. CAPS have minimal resources.
* Community relations	No community relations programs reported.	Not reported.	Not reported.	No formal community relations program.	No formal program. Integration into village life varies widely among CAPS.
* Public health, medicine	Provision of health clinics under military supervision.	Replaced "bush medicine" with modern theory and facilities; built a hospital, utilized native customs; improved sanitation.	Improved sanitation; public health service, hospitals, free clinics.	Provided free medical assistance, a medical department, established hospitals.	Navy Corpsman kept busy by local civilians, PF. Some attempts to teach sanitation.

	PHILIPPINES 1898 - 1946	SAMOA 1900 - 1951	HAITI 1915 - 1934	NICARAGUA 1927 - 1933	CAPS VIETNAM 1965 - 19?
I. Civil Affairs: (continued) *Other	Firm penalties levied against constabulary personnel who abused positions.		Notable exception to poor CA picture was work of Sergeant Wirkus (USMC).	Attempt to resettle rural population failed, creating refugee problem, aided insurgent propaganda.	Population, resources control measures vary re: attention received, degree of success.
J. Selection/Training of Indigenous Personnel for Constabulary	Filipino enlisted men were from all segments of society. Filipino officers commissioned starting in 1912; school set up for constabulary.	Chosen from Samoan villages, given good pay, status, and good training. In time merit system for selection merged with selection by kin. High selection ratio. Very efficient organization.	Elite excluded from responsible position; unsuccessful attempts to train Haitian officers; attempt to force U.S. military codes on indigenes not very successful.	Poor selection of natives for constabulary selection - based on loyalty rather than capabilities. Lack of training in civil affairs.	(Observations during September 1968) Selection of PF not a U.S. function. Limited training of PF. Little followup PF leadership not given official recognition.
K. Communications and Psychological Operations	No formal psyop programs reported but deployment of constabulary throughout country indicated government interest.	Psyop considered in selection of name and uniform for guard, shaping guard organization around existing native forms of organization. Members of guard held in esteem by society - the best aspect of psyop.	No planned psyop to spearhead civil affairs activities, nationbuilding program. Fairly effective program against CACO revolt. Communications by acts of some U.S. personnel were credible, negative, counterproductive.	No planned psyop other than temporary amnesty program. Lack of coordination between U.S. civil and military authorities.	Psy Op at CAP level mostly face-to-face. In most villages greatly handicapped by language barrier. Psy Op by act often good. Very few Marines properly appreciated concept of psy op support of CA activities.
L. Amnesty Program	None described in sources reviewed.	None was required.	Amnesty, offered after CACO revolt, was rather widely accepted.	Originally granted to all dissident elements. Later general amnesty to all insurgents who worked on road projects. About 1/3 of Sandino's forces rallied.	Chieu hoi participation; occasional CAPS appeal to local VC who formerly lived in villages.

	PHILIPPINES 1898 - 1946	SAMAO 1900 - 1951	HAITI 1915 - 1934	NICARAGUA 1927 - 1933	CAPS VIETNAM 1965 - 19?
M. Civil Intelligence Collection	Specified in charter, implemented with considerable success later	Relationships between Navy and local chiefs such that no separate civil intelligence organization needed.	Varied, often poor. Wirkus, using native customs to advantage collected excellent intelligence.	Not frequently reported. In some cases native dep-uties provided good intelligence.	Minimal at higher levels. Greatly handicapped by language barrier. Occasionally a substantially effort by individual CAPs.
N. Grievance System/	None required because of well-developed community unication system between constabulary and inhabitants.	None required. Natives headed local fonos, grievances handled by existing machinery.	Partially successful grievance policy -- improved the image of Guard but insufficiently to counter negative factors.	No formal grievance system reported.	No formal system. PFs report through own channels. Operations by large units major source of grievances.
O. Efforts to learn customs, habits, language to forward U.S. mission	This received emphasis in initial proclamation. Incentive pay for learning language.	Native customs, habits learned and put to good use.	None. Exception - Wirkus.	Little	Minimal language training; Personal Response Program.
P. Did the military as an institution provide constabulary programs, guidance on entry?	No. Taft as commissioner performed role but still some trial and error.	No. Capt. Tilly responsible for programs.	No. Some learning with time.	No. Some learning with time.	No. CAPs evolved some months after landing.

Table 2

AVERAGES OF RATINGS OF U.S. PERFORMANCE IN FIVE CASES

NOTE: Four judges rated performance for each case as described in the text. Averages are tabled below. The highest rating possible is 3; the lowest is -1.

ASPECTS OF PERFORMANCE	PHILIPPINES	SAMOA	HAITI	NICARAGUA	RVN	AVERAGE
Indoctrination/Training of U.S. Forces	2.5	NIA	-.5	-.2	1.0	.7
Relationship Established With Local Authorities	2.1	3.0	-1.0	0.0	1.5	1.1
Civil Affairs	2.5	3.0	1.2	1.0	1.2	1.8
Selection/Training of Indigenous Personnel	2.2	2.7	-.7	-.5	NR	.9
Psychological Operations/Communications	2.0	2.7	-.7	-.2	.8	.9
Establishment/Conduct of Amnesty Program	NR	NR	1.9	2.0	1.7	1.9
Collection/Integration of Civil Intelligence	2.4	NR	.5	0.0	1.5	1.1
Adoption/Operation of Grievance System	2.0	NR	1.8	0.0	NR	1.3
Efforts to Learn Native Habits and Customs	2.8	3.0	-.5	-.2	1.2	1.3
On Entering - Evidence of Institutional Memory	0.5	0.0	-.5	0.0	0.0	0.0
AVERAGE BY CASE	2.1	2.4	.2	.2	1.1	

NIA - No Information Available.

NR - These entries indicate that No Rating was made either because the function did not need to be performed, or because insufficient information was available to raters to provide an adequate basis for ratings.

PART FOUR

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Each of the five constabulary operations brought American military forces into face-to-face contact with foreign populations and officials at the grass-roots level in order to accomplish a U.S. mission. Such contact is a probable feature of U.S. involvement in many limited-conflict contingencies in the future, and many elements of the constabulary format recommend it as an appropriate means for organizing American forces to deal with those contingencies (see Part One, pages 1-4). The objective of this review has been to draw from previous experience lessons that can be applied to present and future needs.

The findings and implications of the study are presented below at two levels. The first section derives broad generalizations from the case studies; its thrust is that while it may include traditional military operations, the constabulary mission differs fundamentally from traditional military missions in its nature and objectives. Hence, a different set of concepts is required to understand it and to accomplish it efficiently. The second section presents recommendations aimed at improving the ability to organize, support, and conduct operations of a constabulary nature.

The chart on pages 110-114 in Part Three summarizes the major elements of constabulary operations across cases and suggests dimensions on which the five experiences are roughly comparable. Admittedly, there are important differences among the cases: the different time frames, host-country culture and political structures, strength or sophistication of opposition to the constabulary, and the organization and purposes of the larger U.S. effort in-country, to cite only the most obvious instances. Granting these variations, what lessons and hypotheses can be derived from the five constabulary operations, considered singly or together?

Understanding the Constabulary Mission

The success of the constabulary effort appears above all to depend on the appropriate and clear definition of mission objectives and their translation into specific guides and priorities for action. U.S. executives in-country need an understanding of the constabulary mission in a broad sense -- an understanding that is translated into actions and priorities among actions. This requirement presupposes that constabulary objectives be derived from and closely integrated into the larger rationale and plan governing U.S. involvement in the host country.

In those situations where American leaders understood the mission in a broad sense, the constabulary operations they directed were more often than not effective. In two cases, the men at the top of the U.S. chain of command clearly grasped the mission. William Howard Taft, High Commissioner to the Philippines, and Captain B. F. Tilley, in Samoa, understood their missions in the broadest sense, developed charters to guide their overall efforts, and translated these into effective constabulary operations. Other individuals, with more confined areas of responsibility, successfully defined their more restricted missions with relatively little guidance from above: Marine General (then Captain) "Chesty" Puller, renowned for his toughness, was nonetheless sensitive to Latin American customs, learned the language, and operated effectively in what was an otherwise mediocre U.S. effort in Nicaragua. Lower in the chain of command is the work of Marine Sergeant Faustin Wirkus in Haiti and that of Sergeant (now Lieutenant) Calvin D. Brown, who developed an effective Combined Action Platoon (CAP) operation in one Vietnamese village.

These instances of successful "adaptation" to the constabulary situation were notable for (1) an individual's recognition of the insufficiency of traditional military approaches, (2) an individual's capacity to develop

strategies, tactics, and techniques appropriate to the situation, and (3) the same individual's ability to implement the new approaches in the midst of all the usual problems of operations in a foreign culture. These successes, in different countries, and times, and at different echelons of the command chain, are taken as proof that U.S. forces can effectively direct and conduct constabulary operations in foreign cultures.

But these experiences have not, by and large, led to concerted efforts to generalize from success and failure, to institutionalize knowledge about methods and tactics that are effective, and to develop doctrine and organization that allow U.S. forces to commence constabulary efforts with the know-how, plans and trained personnel to implement them. The cases studied, possibly excepting the Samoan, were characterized by slow on-the-job learning of which methods are effective and which are not. The amount of time required for the trial-and-error relearning of old lessons that characterized our efforts in Haiti and Nicaragua, and to some extent, in the Philippines, is far too costly in terms of lives, dollars, and the achievement of our objectives in modern low-level conflict. By the time we have learned, insurgents may well be rocketing the capital city. In view of writings of prominent Communist leaders and organizers, including Mao, Guevara, and Giap, and the known Communist propensity to examine in detail, evaluate, and improve their tactics for social control, we must assume that enemies of future constabularies will be ready to profit from the body of experience and know-how being assembled by insurgents now operating.

The failure to institutionalize and to profit from the historical experiences recounted here may be explained by the relative lack of importance assigned to the four operations in the pre-World War II scheme

of things. By military standards, constabularies were clearly peripheral to the principal missions of the American military. As a result, and excepting only the Marine Small Wars Manual, no substantial effort was made to define constabulary missions and objectives or to translate these into operational guides.

Unfortunately, military thinking has been slow to adapt to a context in which the small war or constabulary-like effort is clearly a principal mission of the armed forces. Attempts to develop institutional preparedness for low-level warfare encounter at least three major obstacles. First, military training and operations for conventional warfare are guided by a web of beliefs and assumptions, often implicit, which--reinforced by daily custom and practice--constitute principles for military management; those principles assign low priorities to the development of capabilities for low-level conflict. (Even granting recent recognition of the need for civil affairs and related capabilities, and significant steps toward creation of those capabilities, high-level support for continuous programs required to develop the necessary strategies and tactics has been sporadic.)

Second, Americans tend to become trapped by their world leadership in technology. Regardless of the nature of the problem, Americans are prone to look first, and even exclusively, to hardware solutions. The better sensor, the automated command-control system, the electronic fence--all tend to assume a role in American thinking that cultures we would call primitive ascribe to magic. As products of the American culture, it is understandable that the American military and its engineering support look first to hardware for solutions. Granting the need for superior military force, the five cases studied provide no evidence that superior arms can solve fundamental local problems. Still further ground may be lost if indigenous forces, confronted with internal threats,

accept implicit American propositions that their security depends primarily on military hardware and traditional tactics.

The need for all services to develop low-level warfare capabilities is being increasingly recognized. But here we encounter a third obstacle--the complexity of the strategy and tactics of low-level warfare are greatly underestimated. Officers with or without a few weeks of training are being thrown into psyop and civil affairs billets. As they become active, military managers can say of psyop and civil affairs, "We are doing it now." In fact, more often than not, U.S. forces or the indigenous forces they advise are following a mechanical civic action or psyop protocol without a serious attempt to integrate what is being done into the fabric of the society, or to systematically evaluate its impact. Those who directed U.S. operations in Haiti might have pointed to the schools and roads built under American direction, saying, "We are doing it now," meanwhile failing to foster community development, preempting leadership rather than developing it, and leaving the Haitians with a bad taste for the occupation and negative image of the U.S. Military efforts at the civil interface can be tangential to the mission, or even counterproductive. Until machinery is built into the operational regnimen to integrate these efforts with overall U.S. objectives and to evaluate impact with reference to the local culture, there is no good way to rapidly improve the tactics by which the broad U.S. mission can be implemented. To our knowledge, few resources are being allocated to the complex problem of developing ways to evaluate impact so that what is learned can improve approaches, tactics, and techniques.

To overcome these obstacles is essentially to institutionalize a different body of experience and thinking--and to apply the lessons learned in the constabulary context to the new threats which U.S. policy must meet in the arena of limited or low-level warfare. Some first steps in the definition of appropriate missions and capabilities are outlined in the following section.

Recommendations

To Whom Directed

Customarily, recommendations can be directed to a specific TO unit, but neither the Army nor the Marine Corps carries a constabulary element in its Table of Organization. However, both Marine Corps CAPs and Army Civil Affairs Companies in Viet Nam are conducting constabulary-type missions. Also, a number of U.S. military elements overseas are performing tasks that might be assigned to a constabulary. Among these are Special Forces Detachments, Military Police, some psyop detachments, and even elements of regular units which are stationed in civilian communities, or which have been committed against Communist infrastructures in Operation Phoenix. In the Vietnamese military, Regional and Popular Forces act as constabularies and many regular ARVN units are tasked with pacification missions.

Elsewhere, in Korea, American and ROK elements are performing certain tasks appropriate to constabularies. The same may be said for Thai military and police forces in the northeastern sector of Thailand and along the Kra peninsula. Finally, while this list is not complete, American advisors in a number of countries are working closely with foreign military units that perform a constabulary-type role.

Almost any military unit or detachment drawn from it may be tasked with constabulary duties. Composition of constabularies will differ widely. They may consist of U.S. personnel only, indigenous units, or frequently integrated groups of U.S. and local personnel.

The constabulary may be the only government element in a given county or sector. Or, as in Viet Nam, regular military units may be operating in the same area. In both cases the constabulary performs vital functions. In the latter, its role in outposting and protecting military bases and rear areas, in providing intelligence to regular units, in representing government while denying insurgents the area's human and materiel resources can be crucial. Since with proper coordination constabularies can increase the effectiveness of regular units operating in the same area, commanders of regular units may also profit from these operational recommendations.

Within existing concepts of uses of military forces, a constabulary is one form of organization that performs basically a civil affairs mission. Its key objectives are referenced to the civilian community and its success must be gauged by its ability to gain civil cooperation and to heal the wounds of dissension. Our recommendations for institutional preparedness should be of greatest interest to the civil affairs directorate and the Military Assistance Officer Program (formerly Overseas Security Operations) in the Army; to the Civil Affairs Branch of Marine Corps Headquarters and Marine Schools that teach subjects bearing on preparedness for small wars.

Based on the foregoing, two categories of recommendations follow:

- A. Policies and actions required to develop and support an ongoing constabulary-type capability for limited conflict situations; i. e., institutional preparedness.
- B. Policies and actions that are candidates for implementation during a constabulary-type operation.

The two sets are closely related in that operational capabilities (B) are largely dependent on institutional preparedness (A). Both sets described

below are tentative and incomplete; additional study is needed to test these recommendations.

A. Institutional Preparedness

Among steps the military establishment needs to take to prepare for constabulary operations are the following.

Doctrine Development

In research that would continue the initial steps taken in this study, historical experience with constabularies should be further analyzed, drawing on British and French as well as American experience. Civil affairs and social science perspectives should be brought to bear on these materials to better identify and delineate promising concepts, tactics and techniques.

The concepts and approaches thus identified should be systematically evaluated in a field situation where constabulary operations are in progress. Integration of results would provide tested doctrine and tactics that are central to an institutional memory.

Training

Those who perform constabulary and similar duties need specialized training, including doctrine and area culture and language training. Capabilities should be developed for instructing indigenous officers and men in constabulary-type operations. Training programs would provide a reservoir of trained personnel able to "land on their feet" in foreign areas-- personnel who can start to apply, and teach, the principles of effective constabulary operations soon after debarkation.

Personnel

Career programs for officers and NCOs should be designed to encourage and reward development of knowledge and skills required for constabulary-type operations. (Such programs could be a part of the Army's newly initiated Military Assistance Officer Program, although other services have needs also.)

A personnel indexing system is needed. It should be coded to permit rapid retrieval by training, overseas experience, area knowledge, language knowledge, and graduate training in social sciences. The system, once developed, should be maintained and used.

Area Packet

There is available a wealth of information about most overseas areas wherein constabulary operations are probable. Area and country packets containing the most relevant information, well referenced and in condensed form, are needed along with established procedures for putting such information in the hands of men in-country and on orders to go.¹

Where the above steps have been initiated, they should be reviewed for their applicability to requirements posed by constabulary-type operations. Attention should be focused on integrating the above requirements into a unified approach to preparedness.

¹An instance of failure to transmit results of relevant studies to men in Viet Nam, who need them, was noted in 1966. See M. Dean Havron and Randolph C. Berkeley, Jr., The Role of Civil Affairs in Marine Corps Operations (McLean, Va.: Human Sciences Research, 1966). p. 36.

B. Operational Guides

The following considerations should be reflected in the planning and conduct of operations of a constabulary nature. Previous experience indicates that all or most of the eleven areas discussed below can be critical to the success of such operations.

Translating U.S. Objectives into Operational Guidance

U. S. objectives will often translate into three types of missions, often concurrent.

- a. Protecting the population and property.
- b. Weakening dissident elements.
- c. Assisting in institution- or nation-building.

On first glance it would appear that traditional military subjects--ambush, patrolling, etc.--can be readily adapted to the first type above, and to some extent to the second, although tasks required to deny popular support to dissident elements require additional approaches. There is little or no proven doctrine or tactics for nation-building, or even a generally accepted definition.

The constabulary confronting a skilled ideological enemy cannot rely solely on traditional military tactics. In numbers the constabulary is only a small fraction of the size of the civil population. Realistically it cannot protect the populace and control resources until it can gain the respect and sympathy of the civilian community and translate these into intelligence and support. Competence in ambushes, patrols and so on is not enough; a constabulary's capability to furnish security must be enhanced indirectly by working through the people.

Our interpretation of three cases--Haiti, Nicaragua and Viet Nam-- is that general objectives have not been well translated into the tactics and techniques by which they can best be accomplished. In Viet Nam, the importance of popular support is recognized, but the rationale for using indirect methods to enhance CAP capabilities does not appear to be clear to most CAPs. Methods and tactics developed largely on their own by a few outstanding CAPs are not being applied generally (as of September 1968); nor is the supervisory effort needed to accomplish this allocated. When men are not given specialized training appropriate to this type of situation, they are guided by traditional military training, which, while obviously necessary, is insufficient.

Vitally needed is appropriate guidance which can be used by officers and NCOs to translate broad mission purposes into specific plans and to inform those individuals who stand the best chance of accomplishing them. Some adaptations of general doctrine will be needed in-country, but review of these five cases suggests that they will be, at most, moderate in scope. Were an "institutional memory" available, its doctrinal branch would provide this guidance.

Determining the Objectives and Role of the Constabulary

The objectives and role of the constabulary should be established at the beginning of the operation and in consultation with indigenous authorities. (Often U.S. forces have been in-country for some time before the need for a constabulary was recognized.) Relationship between the constabulary and other forces--both civil and military, both U.S. and indigenous--should be agreed to. Where at all feasible, arrangements should be made early for amnesty programs, for a grievance system, and for broadening the base of indigenous leadership--all those measures that experience has taught are necessary. Most important, the role of

indigenous personnel in the constabulary should be planned as an evolutionary process in which an indigenous capability is created and indigenous responsibilities increase as U.S. personnel are withdrawn. (Of course, if the constabulary is a purely short-term U.S. effort, this guideline may not be applicable, but in any case a critical objective is to create or strengthen indigenous organizations that can work toward political and social harmony.) Finally, constabulary programs should be related to those of other U.S. and indigenous organizations.

Making the Constabulary an Agency of Upward Mobility

Wherever possible, the constabulary should be used as a vehicle for identifying, selecting, and training the talented and capable members of the indigenous population--particularly the youth--for positions of leadership. This goal will be achieved only when local citizens highly regard the constabulary; pay scales attractive by local standards, leadership training, and use of valued cultural symbolism in choice of uniforms, names of constabulary functions and activities, etc., can all help make the constabulary a high status organization. The Philippine and Fita Fita constabularies provide proof that this can be done. Thus, the constabulary becomes a conduit through which intelligent and motivated youngsters are trained for prominent roles in the society.

Training of U. S. Forces for Constabulary Duties

U. S. constabulary experience in the Philippines, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Viet Nam all evidence a slow, trial-and-error process of learning to become effective constabularies. In Haiti and Nicaragua, this

learning was never really satisfactory or complete; the same may be said of CAPs in Viet Nam as of September 1968. If the recommendations presented earlier are accepted, training programs conducted stateside should go a long way to avoid this in the future. Even so, in practice we should anticipate the need for substantial in-country training in constabulary operations, local culture and language.

Several rules of thumb are suggested by previous experience. First, training that emphasizes local language and culture can be continued after entry, if incentives and opportunities are provided. Second, language and culture training before entry is vital, because initial impressions formed by locals are long-lasting and have much to do with our subsequent success or lack of it. Third, the economy of U. S. forces that becomes possible when Americans learn local culture and customs and how to build on them, using them to facilitate activities consistent with U.S. policy, has been well demonstrated by Tilley, Wirkus, Brown, and others.

Civil Affairs and Psyop as
Central to Constabulary Operations

American forces require capabilities to establish an active civil affairs program, supported by psyop, and to train indigenous constabulary and other elements to conduct such programs. Civil affairs activities--including civic action, population and resources control, support for local governments, community relations, and all efforts designed to assist in critical sectors of society--should be oriented first toward gaining the respect and support of the community. Until this is accomplished, little else is possible. As respect is gained, attention can be directed toward longer term measures designed to develop and strengthen local institutions. These activities, in turn, build the role of the indigenous constabulary as a needed force integral

to the community--a force provided by a responsible and responsive government.

Psychological operations is the communications effort that supports the objectives and missions of the U. S. and its indigenous allies. Communications occur by both word and acts: decisions to engage in civic action and to conduct specific activities are communications, as are American acts that show sympathy or condescension, graft or looting by the constabulary, mistreatment of citizens and so forth. As evidenced in Haiti and elsewhere, such acts can communicate far more forcefully than words. Constabulary leaders must be sensitive to this, and close enough to operations to make sure that actions of U.S. and indigenous forces do not compromise concurrent psyop programs and themes.

The psyop communicator plays a vital role. He helps to determine the way in which issues are formulated and structured, suggests logic appropriate to reasoning about them, and invokes moral judgments compatible with indigenous beliefs as to what actions by government representatives and insurgents are right or wrong. Psyop may serve to build pride in the nation and its institutions and to emphasize an identity of interests between leaders and people--an identity which must be supported by appropriate actions of leaders.

Psyop can present the role and responsibilities of the constabulary in an attractive light. It can spread the word about effective constabulary actions, which at the same time become visible proof of its credibility. These efforts in combination can serve as a powerful force to weaken the insurgents' basis for opposing the existing government.

These are perhaps idealistic depictions of roles of civil affairs and psyop. What generalizations can be drawn from the five cases about practice?

First, there are a number of examples of quite effective use of psyop as tactics, but--with the possible exception of the Fita Fita Guard--there is little evidence of a coordinated psyop-civil affairs strategy. Second, in what might be called civil affairs, there has been a great deal of activity--building roads, bridges, schools, helping agriculture, etc.; unfortunately, these projects frequently reflected what we thought was needed, rather than what locals thought they needed. In reviewing the historical cases, the thinking that governed the actions of decision makers in-country is not always evident. But, in Nicaragua and Haiti in particular, construction activities and programs of distribution of goods seemed to become goals in themselves. Apparently, it was not recognized that in relation to an insurgency situation, such activities are no more than tools, and that these tools should serve a higher purpose as catalysts in teaching knowledge and skills, developing community pride, creating popular awareness that the government is serving the people, and so forth. The political and social purpose of American missions can become lost in the effort to produce, on time, targeted numbers of schools, roads, bridges and other such cultural artifacts.

As an illustration of these generalizations, assume that a local community wants a school and that the local constabulary element can provide help. First, it must be understood by the public that the school is to be a joint project by civilians and constabulary. Psyop can explain and encourage the effort. If the locale is Southeast Asia, it may be appropriate for a geomancer to be brought in to help identify the proper site, in terms of the "balance of the elements," orientation of the school with respect to heavenly bodies, and other related factors. Assembling

materials and organizing workers can serve as occasions for training local leaders in planning, developing confidence in the process of planning and in themselves as planners. Construction can serve as a basis for teaching skills that can be used in other private or public projects. The various events can be previously announced by psyop communications; their subsequent occurrence in the construction schedule strengthens psyop credibility. The concept of unity demonstrated by constabulary and citizens working together toward a common goal can be reinforced with completion ceremonies, in which the names of locals who contributed significantly can be listed on a scroll which also praises education consistent with precepts of the local value system. Arrangements for teachers must be made early; this step is often overlooked. The need to pay the teacher can be occasion for public acceptance of a taxation system.

A number of operational benefits can be derived from the school. When the school is in operation, some kind of parent-school organization can be formed, and its roster of students and parents can provide information useful in population and resources control measures. Bright and motivated youngsters may be rewarded with government scholarships, enhancing the government's image and developing loyalty to it. The school can serve as a locus for teaching agriculture, personal hygiene, civics, local history and myths that emphasize national unity, and other subjects related to the government's efforts. As long as it is not a hazard, the extent to which the school building satisfies civil engineering standards is one of the least important aspects of this operation. Finally, when the school is so embedded in community life, the insurgent can only hurt himself by attacking it. If he does, and if psyop identifies him as the perpetrator of the attack, destruction he has wrought becomes visible and irrefutable evidence to support a powerful counterattack on the insurgent's cause and motives.

Above, we have combined separate actions--actions that different Americans overseas have reported taking or fostering--into a micro-strategy for institution building, with the school as a focal element. Taken alone, the several elements of the strategy have limited utility. Power and economy is gained by combining them into programs whose individual components are mutually reinforcing. An apt analogy would be the successive moves of a chess master, each having multiple significance which, combined, achieve victory through overwhelming force. Doctrine and training that could provide Americans overseas a better appreciation of such strategies is obviously important.

Relationships With Local Sources of Power

Within the complex of events that call for U.S. intercession and require a constabulary will usually be a breakdown of trust and amicable relationships between the people and those who would govern them. In Haiti the elite could not govern; in Nicaragua conflicting factions fought; in Viet Nam an antiquated administrative system, staffed largely by functionaries who could only look upward, not to the people, was a ready target for Viet Cong attack; in the Dominican Republic in 1966 conflict between contesting cliques resulted in a sudden breakdown of public services. Thus, specifics will vary widely. But whatever local conditions, a necessary objective of a constabulary is to help reestablish and strengthen relationships between some group of authorities and the people.

Prior to entry of Americans or the creation of an indigenous constabulary, local leaders--informal as well as formal--should be identified by occupation and, at higher echelons, by name. Good working relationships should be established. Although this concern falls naturally in the area of civil affairs and psyop programs, it is sufficiently critical for

special attention. In previous experience, failure to establish such working relationships has led to misunderstanding and clashes over authority spheres, often with the result that influential local leaders have worked against the constabulary effort.

To the extent possible, leaders should be contacted early and continuous contact should be maintained. They should be made aware of planning and operations relating to their localities, and utilized both in the implementation of constabulary efforts and the explanation of those activities to the general population.

Amnesty Programs

In most constabulary and similar efforts, an amnesty program should be established, monitored, and improved by interrogating those who rally and those who do not (for example, POWs). Even where such programs have not been conducted especially well, they have often produced significant and highly cost-effective results. Certain considerations should be part of the planning process: First, an amnesty program can never be regarded as a substitute for superior force and the willingness to use it; the existence of such force can be exploited by psyop. Second, indigenous officials will often be lukewarm to such a program, or may oppose it, directly or indirectly. Third, an amnesty program involves much more than simply broadcasting appeals: promises to returnees must be kept; reeducation programs for returnees can substantially increase the impact of the program. Fourth, mass media communications should be complemented by face-to-face appeals that take advantage of kinship connections, and cooperation of known and respected community leaders. Finally, the new rallier will often provide intelligence willingly, and serve as an agent to bring in his friends.

Establishment of Grievance System

An ever-present constabulary objective is to maintain the respect of the populace and insure that its presence is desirable to civilians. Frictions can readily occur when Americans operate in a foreign environment, especially if the Americans lack training which could sensitize them to local values and customs and prevent misunderstandings of their own actions or actions toward them. Indigenous troops may take their position in the constabulary as a license to be abusive to civilians. News about mistreatment of civilians by Americans or indigenous troops, whether intentional or inadvertent, will spread rapidly through civilian communities, being exaggerated with each re-telling, doing great damage to the image that a constabulary must create, and providing material for insurgent propaganda.

In Haiti and the Philippines, grievance systems were established and were well received by the populace; in Haiti, however, the system was not in itself sufficient to overcome the generally bad impression that Haitians held of the constabulary, but it may well have prevented matters from becoming worse.

A grievance system is primarily a psychological tool. Civilians need an outlet for complaints, and they need to know that the outlet is always available. This knowledge in itself can reduce tensions and provide civilians with reasons for faith in the constabulary and in the government that supports it. Also, a grievance system which is made known to troops and strictly enforced can curb excesses. Results of judgments of grievance cases should be made known to the civilian community.

Language Capability and Civilian Intelligence

Each constabulary element needs a substantial language capability. All outstanding constabulary leaders have learned the native tongue. Observations in RVN in September 1968, indicated that lack of adequate language skills severely compromises the ability of the Marine squad to accomplish its mission as part of the Combined Action Platoon. To succeed, a constabulary needs popular support so that intelligence can flow from civilians to the constabulary rather than to the dissidents. The Americans' language facility, then, is necessary both to work well with their foreign counterparts and to create rapport with people.

Admittedly, constraints imposed by short tours of duty make it extremely difficult to supply enough men in-country with the needed language facility. Several partial solutions might help: incentive pay for language proficiency, training an individual to learn on his own through practice with a foreign national, use of language tapes (which are relatively inexpensive), and distribution of bilingual publications. These and other methods need to be evaluated and the better ones put into effect.

Providing for Supervision and Feedback

Low-level conflict situations often display complex relationships between mission objectives and particular activities undertaken to achieve those objectives. Such activities may be rendered counterproductive even by the style in which they are carried out. Both an objective and a given approach to achieving it may make sense to an American but be non-sensical to locals. Further, a program directed successfully to one sector of society may have adverse impact on other sectors. For these and similar reasons, constabulary-like operations must include carefully

designed systems for monitoring, evaluating, and reporting actions and their impacts up the chain of command. It should not be assumed that doctrine and tactics for constabulary operations (to the extent that they exist) are comprehensive enough to be effective in every situation. A program evaluation of impact is necessary.

Here, a number of difficult issues must be addressed. First, Americans in the field should always be alert to the way their acts are being received. Second, indicators should be developed to provide more systematic appraisals of impact. Among things to be measured are (a) the acceptability and success of constabulary actions and specific projects as perceived by their intended beneficiaries; (b) the popular image of the constabulary, and the support accorded it by the people; (c) the degree to which the constabulary is perceived as a respected symbol and representative of government--whether the constabulary serves as an effective agent to explain and represent government and to persuade citizens to identify psychologically with their government and nation.

Third, steps must be taken to assure that valid indicators are properly used. This is difficult when the field operator, basically untrained in evaluation, is, in effect, reporting on his own performance, as is often the case.

Fourth, it is assumed that these reports are used in-country for supervisory purposes, and that they are synthesized and relayed to training and evaluation centers in the states.

As information about operations is being selectively summarized and interpreted at successive links up the command chain, counter-measures are needed to prevent it from becoming progressively closer to what higher authorities want to hear, while concurrently losing validity about what is actually happening in the field.

These problems of assuring valid reporting and feedback both for supervision of operating elements and to improve operating doctrine, are very real, complex and difficult. Two partial solutions are recommended for consideration. First, rotating inspectors can provide direct feedback and first-hand information about grass-roots operations to very high levels of authority. Second, further development is needed of indicators, of methods by which constabulary projects and actions can be more precisely related to scores on indicators, and of means for reducing bias in reporting systems.

The Value of an Institutional Memory: Examples

Our experiences in Vietnam show once again both the requirements for effective action by forces operating in close contact with foreign nationals and the slow recognition of, and response to, these requirements which characterized our operations in Haiti and Nicaragua, and to some extent in the Philippines. These and other cases, for example, experience of the British in Malaya and U.S. experience in the HUK rebellion in the Philippines, might have supplied data which could have been institutionalized for guidance in Vietnam.

It is not unreasonable to believe that had U.S. forces entered South Vietnam in 1955 with a better understanding of the dynamics of insurgency, and the requirements that insurgency places on those who would contest it, the U.S. and the Republic of Vietnam would be far better off today. For example, the Haitian and Nicaraguan cases suggest that an amnesty program, imaginatively implemented, can be one of the counterinsurgent's most effective tools. In Vietnam, the cost of killing a Viet Cong soldier in combat

has been estimated to be roughly one hundred times greater than the cost of securing one rallier by the Chieu Hoi amnesty program. Nevertheless, we were in Vietnam ten years before resources and support were given to this program in amounts commensurate with pay-offs reasonably to be expected. Even then, heavy reliance was placed on printed media carrying messages often prepared by educated Catholic refugees from Hanoi to semi-literate peasants. Face-to-face communications with insurgents, which were effective in Haiti and which were found far more credible than written materials in British operations in Malaya, received little attention. Even so, the Chieu Hoi program has helped bring in scores of thousands of ralliers.

In Vietnam and in most developing nations, the leadership base is very narrow. Typically those who have reached positions of influence are members of a small urban elite who share few sympathetic ties with the rural populace. Thus, the society is vulnerable to insurgents and the development of viable institutions is difficult. It is tempting to contemplate what might have been the impact of an educational and leadership development program beginning in 1955. Taking a lesson from Samoa, such a program might have drawn the most intelligent and motivated youngsters from the rice paddies, put them through high school, followed by a year or so of college level training in government and public administration. Parents could have been compensated for loss of their services. The combination of family ties, strong in the Orient, and formal training in public responsibility would have created a stronger, representative, leadership base with sympathetic roots in the countryside, and a government image far less vulnerable to exploitation by Viet Cong propagandists and recruiters.

Other examples might be given. In many cases they would reinforce the argument for greater attention to constabulary-like operations. Thus, the demonstrated effectiveness of some CAPs suggests that much greater success can be realized at lower costs, if constabulary-type efforts are treated as major components of the U.S. armamentorium for overseas operations. The first requirement is to institutionalize at home the lessons available from the military history of small wars, so that a well trained core of men can put into effect overseas those measures that directly address the substance of the problems found there.

Related HSR Research

This study is a part of a continuing HSR effort to understand social, psychological and political factors that correlate with effectiveness in low-level conflict and ways in which this knowledge can practically be put to use. Relevant reports, listed below, may be obtained from DDC. This work has been supported by the Office of Naval Research and the Marine Corps.

The Office of Naval Research is currently supporting a more intensive HSR study of the CAP effort, reported as the fifth case in Part II, the purpose being to draw on experience to develop the concepts and specific tactics and techniques which can feasibly be incorporated in CAP operations to improve effectiveness. Under active consideration by the Marine Corps is a proposal to test these tactics and techniques in operations by Combined Action Platoons.

William W. Chenault (ed.), The HSR Conference on Psychological Operations and Communications with Foreign Nationals (McLean, Va.: Human Sciences Research, Inc., 1968).SECRET

This conference, held in June 1968, was attended by officers and officials from the State and Defense Departments, U. S. Information Agency, the Agency for International Development and the Central Intelligence Agency. This conference explored recent research in psychological operations. Weaknesses and recommendations for improvement were detailed and discussed by conferees.

James M. Dodson, William W. Chenault, and M. Dean Havron The Role of Psychological Operations in Naval Missions: An Appraisal and Recommendations (McLean, Va.: Human Sciences Research, Inc., 1968).

Recommends changes in Navy doctrine and organization to improve existing capabilities to use psychological operations in cold war situations and meet the special requirements small wars pose for military forces.

M. Dean Havron and Randolph C. Berkeley, Jr. The Role of Civil Affairs in Marine Corps Operations (McLean, Va.: Human Sciences Research, Inc., 1966).

This study, sponsored by the U. S. Marine Corps, sought to define the role of civil affairs in present and future Marine Corps operations. Historical materials and three case studies--a classic amphibious assault, and operations in Viet-Nam and the Dominican Republic--provided content. Some 18 recommendations were made, of which 14 were implemented by the Marine Corps.

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